Analysis: Jordan's balancing act by UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
Analysis: Jordan's balancing actBy Leigh Baldwin
United Press International
September 29, 2005
Jordan, considered among the most stable countries in the Arab world, has not escaped the current of change running through the region.
The new climate emerged after a shift in American policy in the Middle East. Where previously the United States was content to strike pragmatic bargains with the region's autocrats, post-9/11 political opinion sees democratic development as the best defense against extremism. Jordan's King Abdullah, whose government depends on American economic support, has come under increasing pressure from his closest ally to accelerate reform.
East and west of the desert kingdom, change is afoot. Both the Palestinian Territories and Iraq have held democratic elections while further afield, Egypt and Lebanon are also making faltering steps toward more popular government.
External pressure is not the only imperative. Jordan, barren in natural resources, once enjoyed guaranteed cheap oil from Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Since the invasion, pipelines have not been operating and crude is instead shipped from the Saudi port of Yanbu to Aqaba, where it is transferred to trucks. This is costly and inefficient. Gas prices are rising, as is popular discontent.
And behind any social unease in the Arab world lurks the specter of Islamist extremism. While Jordan's most notorious export, al-Qaida leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, wreaks destruction in Iraq, ways are being sought to forestall radicalism by including potential dissidents in the political process.
The result of all this has been the National Agenda, a consultative process launched by the king last February, according to which a royally appointed 26-man council is due to announce its recommendations for reform by the end of September.
Is the process credible? "People are very skeptical," says Joost Hintermann of the International Crisis Group in Amman. The council is comprised entirely of loyalists to the regime -- former ministers, tribal leaders, businessmen, academics. Technocrats and young reformists are unrepresented.
Yet Hintermann sees no cause for excessive pessimism. "This process involves more than high-falutin' language," he says. In contrast with previous attempts at change, "all proposals will be linked directly to the national budget." This time, reform may be structural as well as rhetorical.
At the center of the reform debate is controversy over the electoral system. Under current electoral laws, towns such as Zarqa, home of Zarqawi and inhabited mostly by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, are underrepresented politically. They elect far fewer parliamentary delegates than many smaller towns where inhabitants are of Bedouin tribal origin and loyal to the regime. These towns have proved fertile ground for radical Islam.
The existing electoral system of 'one man, one vote' is skewed in favor of the tribes, opposition movements claim. Given only one ballot, those in Bedouin areas vote largely according to tribal loyalty, often for a relative. Changes to the law currently under consideration would allow a supplementary vote for parties or candidates on a national list.
The regime fears that such an amendment would transfer power away from loyalists to more hostile Islamist and Palestinian factions.
But the government need not necessarily be wary of a cautious broadening of popular political involvement, says Samer Abu Libdeh, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
"A new electoral law would enable certain movements to appear," he says. "Liberal and social democratic movements are not well organized because of the party law that hinders their formation. The Islamist movement will, of course, benefit. They are better organized. But they care less about being in power than about the Shariah (Islamic law.) Political and economic concerns are not of interest to them."
How much change can the government permit if it is to retain power? Is there a red line that even the modernizing king will not cross?
"I assume there is," says Hintermann. "With changes to the parliamentary system, you'd be giving power to people who directly oppose the foreign policy of the regime."
"Abdullah is performing a balancing act," he explains. Jordan's close relationship with the United States is widely unpopular. In this respect, Abdullah finds himself in the opposite position to that in which his father, King Hussein, found himself during the first Gulf War. Hussein opposed the invasion of Iraq, gaining approval at home but antagonizing the United States and damaging Jordan economically in the process.
"Abdullah is facing an economic crunch. He must stay close to the U.S. to gain economic benefits and hope that these trickle down to the masses."
But unlike Hintermann, Marwan Dudin, a former minister and advisor to the king, sees no reason why reforms should not succeed. Jordan is reaping the benefit of its position as a stable country in turbulent surroundings, he says. "We are a safe haven for money in the region. Kuwaitis and Saudis are investing heavily."
Nor should lack oil cause irreparable damage, he adds, explaining that a new deal with Egypt to pipe cheap natural gas to Jordan is meeting 50 percent of the country's electricity needs. Furthermore, improvements to the east in the next few years would provide oil for Jordan's new refinery, due to open in 2007 -- a timely event, given the global shortage in refining capacity. "If things settle down in Iraq, things will improve."
Questioned on voting reform, Dudin rebuts suggestions that intransigence could be dangerous. " 'One man, one vote' is, after all, what they have in the U.K," he laughs. "This is the model for our democracy. If it is good enough for them, it is good enough for us."
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