The Jordanian experience (in Media and reform) - by Amy Henderson
The Jordanian experience by Amy Hendersonbitterlemons-international.org - Middle East roundtable Media and reform
May 26, 2005, 2005 Volume 3 Edition 19
Jordan's "new era" has been filled with ambiguities and inconsistent policies toward the media that find their roots in Jordan's political structure. Historically, the media interests of the monarchy and those of a conservative establishment that supported it were, for the most part, one and the same. Now they no longer necessarily coincide.
Since King Abdullah II ascended to the throne, inconsistencies in media policy have derived from a battle of wills between the country's liberal reformers, who want to see a reorganization of the social bases of power and a deepening of economic reform, and status quo conservatives.
The king and a small coterie of advisors and officials seem frequently torn between the impulses of both. For the sake of the country's long-term stability, the regime advocates reform. At the same time, there is a prevailing concern that too much reform--especially during times of crisis--could facilitate destabilization. Consequently, Abdullah at times has led the charge toward greater openness only to be blocked by the establishment, and at other moments retreated, appearing in lock step with conservatives.
The first four years of the king's reign were replete with instances in which establishment conservatives successfully blocked media reform initiatives. Abdullah urged the government to open the country to media investments, apparently to attract some of the Europe-based Arab satellite business to Jordan. Advocates of the idea cited three possible advantages: to draw high-tech, capital intensive industry to the country, to absorb excess human resources, and to create competition for local media, raising the standards of national journalism.
The government and parliament colluded to derail the project, however: issues as diverse as national security and pornography were drawn into the debate. A draft law written by an unenthusiastic government was shelved, and was anyway nothing to write home about. It delineated a media investment "zone": media based there would be free.
The Jordanian media, however, was not entitled to invest there, and consequently would remain subject to Jordan's restrictive press and publication law and the penal code. Parliament did not accept the government's distinction between Jordanian and foreign media, and expressed its anxiety about the pending loosening of social and moral codes should such a zone ever materialize. The project was shelved. A few months later, Dubai seized the idea as a component of its own high-tech drive. Media privatization has also been demonstrative of the regime's perplexity over how best to deal with the media.
In 2000, Abdullah recommended that the government divest from major newspapers. Several proposals were advanced and by May 2001 the "privatization" was complete. It involved the Jordan Press Foundation, in which the state relinquished 6.7 percent of its equity. Prior to the sale, the ownership structure was as follows: the government owned 15 percent of its shares through the Jordan Investment Corporation, JIC (the investment arm of the government), and 47 percent through the Social Security Corporation, SSC. The majority of JIC shares were purchased by the SSC, in effect a sale from the left hand to the right. Government ownership in the other major papers (30 percent of Al Dustour and 22 percent of Al Arab Al Yawm) has not changed and the equity of the fully government-owned Jordan Radio and Television and the Jordan News Agency, Petra, is not likely to see the auction block any time soon.
Efforts to reform the media sector have not only met resistance from establishment conservatives, but also from the media itself. Conservatives have traditionally benefited from state ownership of media. Appointments and positions in the media have been distributed as patronage: top appointments are often politically motivated, and less senior positions were often filled through the establishment network. This has facilitated the deterioration of professional journalism and an acceptance of mediocrity at some of the largest media institutions. Across-the-board reorganization and restructuring of the media threaten to reveal the weaknesses of unqualified personnel in the face of competition, as well as curb the establishment's ability to dominate public discourse and distribute patronage.
There are several independent weekly newspapers in circulation, mostly opposition papers, and one independent daily, Al Ghad, established in 2004. However, the plethora of independent publications has not facilitated the media's mobilization. On the contrary, the Jordanian media is a house divided, and consequently, it cannot stand up to state pressure. The mainstream media frequently accuses the tabloid press of compromising professional credibility, while the opposition accuses the mainstream media of complicity with the regime.
Media reform has anyway been something of a moot point since September 11, an event that revealed the extent to which the regime still grapples with the national security conundrum. Temporary amendments to the penal code, subject to no parliamentary oversight, were swift and expanded the already vague limits on free expression delineated in the press and publications law. The amendments allowed courts to temporarily or permanently ban publications for publishing false information or rumors, aggravating social norms, inciting violence or hatred, or harming the honor or reputation of individuals. Offenders were threatened with three-year prison sentences, fines of some $7,000, or both.
The new amendments also expanded an article that criminalizes insulting the dignity of the king, and made such offenses eligible for trial in the state security court. Similar restrictions were already included in the law, which further prohibits the publication of any information or image that jeopardizes relations with friendly states, insults the head of friendly states, degrades religion or undermines the country's economic and fiscal stability.
In light of continuing Palestinian-Israeli violence and the US-led war on Iraq and continuing instability there, these restrictions were kept in place. The effects have been dramatic and have included the arrest and imprisonment of several journalists and the closure of media offices in Amman. The local media has since complained of a lack of access to information and harassment from the authorities (including being summoned by the security services for questioning, unofficial threats, direct interference in work, official threats, and denial of entry into public activities). Last year, the government proposed amendments to the press and publications law that would forbid the arrest or imprisonment of journalists for press offenses and began drafting an access to information law, while journalists also cited a noticeable decline in interference by the authorities in their work and a drop in the detainment of journalists. But while overt repression has abated, there have been as yet no substantial changes to the difficult legal environment in which the media has always operated.
Compounding matters, the only institution that represents the media, the Jordan Press Association, has typically been an extension of the state's repressive media policy, not a shield against it. A journalist not a member in good standing of the JPA can be legally barred from working. However, it is often the JPA, not the government, that endeavors to apply this rule to the media. In fact, the government has in the past urged the JPA to curb its enthusiasm for harassing journalists: the JPA tried to take the government to court to force it to apply the law.
The liberal-conservative competition within and for the media is likely to re-ignite if Abdullah moves ahead with political reforms as he has promised to do later this year. Nevertheless, the media may prove to be one of the most difficult sectors to reform. There is resistance from within, and, added to the fact that many Jordanians genuinely fear retaliation for speaking their minds openly, the media enjoys little credibility among the population. Few voices have been raised in opposition to frequent government crackdowns on the press in the last decade.
Consequently, the reformers within may have difficulty in finding allies in civil society to take up the cudgels for a fully free and independent Jordanian press.
Amy Henderson is a Middle East-based freelance journalist and the former national news editor of the Jordan Times.
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