A very good and timely piece by Rami Khoury - I couldn't have agreed more
Can Jordan fight terror, democratically?By Rami G. Khouri
Wednesday, November 23, 2005
The lingering fallout from the November 9 terror attack against three hotels in Amman continues to be characterized by a peculiarly Jordanian combination of determination and indecision. The bold and courageous willingness by King Abdullah II and his state security capabilities to confront the criminals who kill civilians throughout the region and the world is somewhat countered by
a corresponding meekness in promoting the kind of domestic political reforms that would pull the rug out from under the terrorists, both in Jordan and regionally.
Amman is swirling with political emotions, expectations and rumors, as the results of the attacks remain unclear to most people.
There is also a widespread sense that things cannot stay the same - This has been on the surface for quite sometime now (AZ). Fighting terrorism with the same old methods will
work to a large extent, but will not prevent determined criminals from doing their evil deeds.
A qualitatively different kind of anti-terror policy is needed, and Jordan is one of the few places in the Arab world that could envisage moving down that path.I mentioned last week that
Jordan, unlike most other Arab states, has a special opportunity to make the sorts of historic, substantive changes in its society that could provide the first successful Arab example of a country that fights terror not only by military, security and intelligence means, but also by mobilizing Jordanians to forge a political culture based on inclusion and accountability that gives the terrorists and extremists no fertile ground in which to operate - This is one opportunity the leadership in Jordan can not miss (AZ). The general threat throughout the Middle East, and increasingly globally, is the spread of an extremist political ideology that also uses violence against its own societies as well as against foreign targets. Terror by Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
are symptoms of a deeper malaise, and older distortions and tensions in Arab society. These are fundamentally political in nature, along with economic and social aspects that cannot be ignored. The core pan-Arab problem that has allowed fundamentalist religious extremism to flourish and terror groups to emerge is the problem of abuse of political authority and economic resources in societies where average citizens feel increasingly alienated and powerless - Rami si so right in his analysis, terrorism directed at muslisms and non-muslims, arabs and non-arabs is the major symptom of a Sickness that has been plaguing the Arab society for years (AZ) . Blowing up hotels and embassies gives humiliated and marginalized Arabs a sense of empowerment, resistance and self-assertion, in ways not available to them through existing political systems. This happens, and expands, primarily because of
domestic indignities within Arab society, and these in turn are aggravated by the policies of Israel, the United States and other foreign powers whose troops routinely enter or sometimes occupy Arab lands for years at a time.
Defeating terror requires eliminating the underlying political environment allowing it to breed.
The antidote to terror is not only security measures managed by
police and intelligence agencies, or tougher new laws enforced by interior ministries.
The antidote is a political and economic culture in which a majority of ordinary citizens feel empowered, represented and respected as citizens with equal rights. This kind of citizenry,
working closely with its security agencies, can then provide political legitimacy and police efficiency that defeats existing terror groups and prevent new ones from springing up.
Jordan has the chance to pioneer this concept, if it can muster the courage and boldness on the political front that Abdullah has already shown on the security front, and in his assertions of the moderation of Islam represented by his own Hashemite family - I honestly doubt that the leadership has what it takes, courage, boldness, forsight and wisedomm, to grab this chance as shown by the lack of commitment and progress in the last three years in the reform track (AZ). Since November 9, we have witnessed political solidarity and moral indignation in Jordan - but these alone are not effective long-term tools in the battle against extremism and terror.
Practical political transformations are now needed to transform popular indignation and the leadership's moral boldness into a new phenomenon: Arab democracy, in which security agencies connect with and are empowered by their own citizenry, but also are held accountable to it.
Here are some ideas for procedures that could be instituted in Jordan to forge a closer, healthier relationship among the security services, the political institutions and the citizenry as a whole.
Jordan is uniquely placed today to do this because of the rare combination of assets and conditions defining it. The country enjoys strong public support for the king and leadership. The political elite has spoken often and impressively about setting an example of democratic transition and political reforms for the Arab world - but to date without its deeds matching its words - So right. We have become frustrated with plan after plan, with cabinet reshuffle after cabinet reshuffle,... till we became a nation of ministers, none of which has an accomplishment to be proud of and even those who want to affect change aren't given the opportunity as our cabinets are changed at least once every three months (AZ). The security apparatus is efficient and respected. It is time to bring these three forces together into a more profound political culture.
Four specific areas of innovation can be explored, benefiting the security agencies and the public at large.
The first is to forge a more formal, institutional link between the security system and the public through a civilian oversight body that meets regularly with the security leadership to evaluate policies and strategies, discuss complaints, evaluate budgets, make suggestions, and, most importantly, generate a sense of accountability and solidarity that is not always there now. A small group of distinguished persons could be appointed by the king as a security-sector advisory and oversight council, a modest first step toward a more institutionalized accountability mechanism that could be developed later. An even more limited trial could be done by appointing a civilian oversight committee to review the work of the anti-corruption department within the intelligence department.
A second step would be to open
the security sector to greater cooperation with the media, starting with regular interviews and press briefings, including background and off-the-record briefings.
If citizens knew more about the work, methods, needs and aims of the security agencies, this would have two powerful impacts: it would take away much of the sense of marginalization and powerlessness that many citizens feel in the face of their state security systems, which, they assume, can act with impunity; and it would, conversely, prompt many citizens to cooperate legitimately with the police and security sectors. More mutual trust between citizen and security agencies would benefit both.
A third possible move would be
to forge a more structured relationship of mutual accountability between the security agencies and both the elected lower house of Parliament and the appointed Upper House. This sort of give-and-take could happen in public at one level - the televised discussion of the security-sector budget, for example - while other issues would need to be discussed in closed committees.
The fourth suggestion relates to the police force, which is the security agency that is in the most direct, daily contact with the public at the local neighborhood level. It is vital that
police-community relations be improved and injected with a mechanism for two-way communication, feedback, complaints and problem-solving initiatives. It would be relevant now to establish some local police-community relations councils that include not just the traditional sheikhs and tribal and business leaders, but also young people, including women, who have their own security issues to raise. The police cannot ensure security alone; they can only do so with the active participation of communities.
These are four simple ideas that could be explored, among many others. Perhaps Jordanian citizens could be asked to send suggestions to the king and the government on how to forge a stronger relationship of accountability and communication between citizens and the security system.
This is absolutely crucial to the three goals that Jordan seeks to achieve and that confront all Arab states: fighting terrorism; promoting a stable society that does not give rise to extremist movements; and achieving a dignified, prosperous life for all citizens through political, economic, social and educational reforms. At some point, some Arab government will have to stop talking about these goals and start taking practical measures to achieve them.
Jordan has the best opportunity to do that, given its unique set of circumstances today. I hope it does so, and creates that one example of a democratic, inclusive, accountable Arab political culture in which stability emanates from the dignity and self-confidence of a satisfied citizenry, rather than from open-ended security laws and often unaccountable security agencies.
FOR GOD'S SAKE, NOT ANOTHER CABINET RESHUFFLE.... Jordan's government quits, monarch appoints new PM
Jordan's government quits, monarch appoints new PM
Thu Nov 24, 2005 9:51 AM ET
By Suleiman al-Khalidi
AMMAN (Reuters) - Jordan's King Abdullah appointed national security chief as prime minister on Thursday, two weeks after triple suicide bombings killed 60 people, a senior official said.
The official said the monarch asked acting national security head, Marouf Bakheet, who had also been serving as the king's office chief of staff, to form a new government following the resignation of Adnan Badran, 69, a U.S.-educated academic appointed last April, and his government. The choice of Bakheet, 58, a former ambassador to Israel with a long career in military intelligence, underscores the king's desire to give security forces a bigger role in decision making, a senior official told Reuters.
Although the changes had long been expected, security concerns have become a priority after the November 9 bombings at three luxury hotels, claimed by Al Qaeda wing in Iraq, headed by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Bakheet's appointment also signals the monarch wants to give more influence to old-guard military figures with a reputation for integrity and untainted by corruption, senior officials say.
Officials say the monarch will count on Bakheet to win support for his much touted economic and political reforms among the powerful conservative establishment -- the backbone of the monarch's power base -- which fears accelerated reforms could lead to an erosion of its grip on power."He (Bakheet) will balance security concerns with the need to push forward His Majesty's reform agenda to move the country toward greater political liberties," said one senior official. Bakheet is expected to form his government in the next few days.
WIDER CHANGES
The government change was part of a wider reshuffle that had been planned for months, including a shakeup of the royal court to bring in new advisors and the appointment of a new upper house with seasoned politicians to redress an imbalance against tribal politicians.King Abdullah surprised many when he appointed Badran to succeed Faisal al-Fayez, blamed by politicians for several policy blunders, including mismanagement of government finances.Tough parliamentary criticism of Badran's performance has been viewed as the most direct challenge to Abdullah since he assumed the throne in 1999.In the summer, Badran had to succumb to tribal pressure and accept the resignation of Bassem Awadallah, the king's favorite moderniser, and the driving force behind accelerated reforms.
Conservative deputies accused Badran of promoting a pro-Western reform agenda and ignoring tribal sensitivities. Political insiders say the king had been very frustrated with conservative politicians wielding extensive powers, who had tried to put the brakes on democratic reforms fearing they may dilute the influence of their Bedouin power base. They fear the king would promote changes in the electoral law which reformers say could give Palestinians bigger representation in parliament, now dominated by tribal politicians long seen as the backbone of the king's support. Most powers rest with the king, who appoints governments, approves legislation and can dissolve parliament.
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, against three hotels in the Jordanian's capital Amman on Wednesday evening, November 9th, 2005
. Firstly, the group has its own agenda and not necessary that of the main group led by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahri; secondly, it lacks clear strategic vision of its objectives and plans; and thirdly it has a "surplus of force" in terms of men, equipment and logistical capability.
In addition to what has been said regarding "power struggle" within Al-Qaeda and the reported message sent by Al-Zawahri to Al-Zarqawi, which reveals a conflict in their points of view; it is clear that Al-Zarqawi's attacks, especially in his main battlefield (Iraq), are carried out without any coordination or agreement with "Al-Qaeda of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahri".
Despite the historical "status" of Bin Laden as the world's most wanted after 9/11 attacks, nobody denies that Al-Zarqawi gained a higher status among those who are called "princes of terrorism " due to the semi daily mass killing attacks against Iraqi civilians, policemen, and army men, especially the Shiites, in addition to the continuous kidnapping and killing operations against civilians and diplomats in Iraq.
In this context, the actual status of Al-Zarqawi and his group have been elevated to the extent that one can't categorize them as a mere branch of a larger group. There is no doubt that the state of Al-Qaeda's fragmentation is due to the severe and relentless blows it has suffered and the tight siege on its prominent leaders. This situation gave rise to Zarqawi's leadership and his agenda, which differs from that of bin Laden's.
While the main group of Al-Qaeda tries to launch attacks against Western targets, especially in the Western capitals and cities and accelerate a shameful American withdrawal from Iraq, most of Al-Zarqawi's efforts are directed towards the Shiites and civilians in Iraq, and the guests of hotels and wedding celebrations in Amman.
Currently, Bin Laden seeks to carry out attacks against Anglo-Saxon targets or against countries participating in what he calls "the crusaders' campaign against Islam." This is clear in the operations launched against the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, aimed at embarrassing the Western governments and influencing their peoples and media to force changes in their governments' policies towards the region and speed up the dismantling of the Western coalition on "war on terrorism." But it seems the abovementioned motives are not priorities on Al-Zarqawi's agenda.
We cannot endorse any assessment that lessens the impact of the atrocities committed by Al-Qaida against Islam and Muslims in particular and humanity in general, but
comparing what is done by this group, founded in the late 1980s, with what is apparent from Al-Zarqawi's agenda after Iraq's occupation shows how these terrorist groups have evolved in their savage and appalling acts.An essential question arises about the objectives of the planners of the Amman attacks that killed 57 and injured around 100 persons. Despite the dozens of articles and analyses that filled the media about these attacks, many people have not figured out yet the precise objectives of Al-Zarqawi group. There doesn't seem to be a lack of analyses; instead, it is clear that the officials' assessments and monitors' analyses failed to identify logical pretexts for the crime due to the absence of such pretexts in the first place.
The immediate results of the attacks have been clear on the Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and international levels, which widely rejected and condemned the attacks. It seems that these attacks increased the solidarity of the Jordanian society and enhanced the ties between the Jordanian leadership and its people. Thus, Al-Qaeda group (in Iraq) lost a lot of the sympathy that was gaining from the Jordanian street, which considered the group's activities in Iraq as fighting the occupation.
On the other hand, the Jordanian security services have become more vigilant and more prepared to face future operations and to control the Iraqi borders. King Abdullah declared that he is fully and relentlessly determined to combat terrorism. He added also that his country "will no longer tolerate those adopting deviating thoughts of Takfeer (charging others of being infidels)." Jordan now is receiving offers of help for coordination and security from many countries and great powers in the region and international community.
In a simple review, it is clear that until now these attacks didn't yield their perpetrators any fruits. And the statement that Al-Zarqawi group was forced to issue after declaring its responsibility of the attacks, which seems to justify the attacks rather than to explain them, may support this suggestion. The statement, which came after huge protests arranged by Jordanians against terrorism, stated that the attacks "targeted anti Islamic centers and favorite sites for the USA and Israeli intelligence members." Undoubtedly, this statement cannot improve the image of the group in view of its huge blunder and lack of logic.Referring back to the third conclusion of the Amman attacks regarding the "Al-Zarqawi group's surplus of power," it is definitely not a positive one since that power can be used to harm soft civilian targets in many countries. And "surplus of power" here means what the group has in terms of suicide persons, arms, and logistical capability as embodied in training, transportation, accommodation, preparations, coordination, and communications. All these were available outside the Iraqi borders (the main battlefield that needs all the available abilities) and were used in attacks that one cannot imagine having rational objectives behind them, even from the view of Al-Zarqawi's greatest sympathizers or the extreme opponents of the Jordanian policies.
In fact, the November attacks in Amman represent, in many ways, a point of departure. The attacks are the severest that have hit the Jordanian capital in history, and they will surely be highly effective in rallying the public and governmental efforts against terrorism in Jordan. These attacks will certainly enhance the international and regional coordination efforts against terrorism and reduce the emphasis on the international and regional factors that feed that sympathy, especially those related to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the Israeli practices against the Palestinians.Whether the Amman blasts came as a result of "surplus of power" in Al-Zarqawi's group, or to achieve certain goals inside Jordan, or due to strategic mistake, or tactical error, it is clear that recruiting Iraqi suicide attackers, directing them to carry out operations in a capital known for its high security measures, and launching attacks leading to many victims, are factors that should increase caution and hasten the efforts to develop regional and international strategies and mechanisms to combat the terrorist attacks in their different phases.
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, against three hotels in the Jordanian's capital Amman on Wednesday evening, November 9th, 2005
. Firstly, the group has its own agenda and not necessary that of the main group led by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahri; secondly, it lacks clear strategic vision of its objectives and plans; and thirdly it has a "surplus of force" in terms of men, equipment and logistical capability.
In addition to what has been said regarding "power struggle" within Al-Qaeda and the reported message sent by Al-Zawahri to Al-Zarqawi, which reveals a conflict in their points of view; it is clear that Al-Zarqawi's attacks, especially in his main battlefield (Iraq), are carried out without any coordination or agreement with "Al-Qaeda of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahri".
Despite the historical "status" of Bin Laden as the world's most wanted after 9/11 attacks, nobody denies that Al-Zarqawi gained a higher status among those who are called "princes of terrorism " due to the semi daily mass killing attacks against Iraqi civilians, policemen, and army men, especially the Shiites, in addition to the continuous kidnapping and killing operations against civilians and diplomats in Iraq.
In this context, the actual status of Al-Zarqawi and his group have been elevated to the extent that one can't categorize them as a mere branch of a larger group. There is no doubt that the state of Al-Qaeda's fragmentation is due to the severe and relentless blows it has suffered and the tight siege on its prominent leaders. This situation gave rise to Zarqawi's leadership and his agenda, which differs from that of bin Laden's.
While the main group of Al-Qaeda tries to launch attacks against Western targets, especially in the Western capitals and cities and accelerate a shameful American withdrawal from Iraq, most of Al-Zarqawi's efforts are directed towards the Shiites and civilians in Iraq, and the guests of hotels and wedding celebrations in Amman.
Currently, Bin Laden seeks to carry out attacks against Anglo-Saxon targets or against countries participating in what he calls "the crusaders' campaign against Islam." This is clear in the operations launched against the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, aimed at embarrassing the Western governments and influencing their peoples and media to force changes in their governments' policies towards the region and speed up the dismantling of the Western coalition on "war on terrorism." But it seems the abovementioned motives are not priorities on Al-Zarqawi's agenda.
We cannot endorse any assessment that lessens the impact of the atrocities committed by Al-Qaida against Islam and Muslims in particular and humanity in general, but
comparing what is done by this group, founded in the late 1980s, with what is apparent from Al-Zarqawi's agenda after Iraq's occupation shows how these terrorist groups have evolved in their savage and appalling acts.An essential question arises about the objectives of the planners of the Amman attacks that killed 57 and injured around 100 persons. Despite the dozens of articles and analyses that filled the media about these attacks, many people have not figured out yet the precise objectives of Al-Zarqawi group. There doesn't seem to be a lack of analyses; instead, it is clear that the officials' assessments and monitors' analyses failed to identify logical pretexts for the crime due to the absence of such pretexts in the first place.
The immediate results of the attacks have been clear on the Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and international levels, which widely rejected and condemned the attacks. It seems that these attacks increased the solidarity of the Jordanian society and enhanced the ties between the Jordanian leadership and its people. Thus, Al-Qaeda group (in Iraq) lost a lot of the sympathy that was gaining from the Jordanian street, which considered the group's activities in Iraq as fighting the occupation.
On the other hand, the Jordanian security services have become more vigilant and more prepared to face future operations and to control the Iraqi borders. King Abdullah declared that he is fully and relentlessly determined to combat terrorism. He added also that his country "will no longer tolerate those adopting deviating thoughts of Takfeer (charging others of being infidels)." Jordan now is receiving offers of help for coordination and security from many countries and great powers in the region and international community.
In a simple review, it is clear that until now these attacks didn't yield their perpetrators any fruits. And the statement that Al-Zarqawi group was forced to issue after declaring its responsibility of the attacks, which seems to justify the attacks rather than to explain them, may support this suggestion. The statement, which came after huge protests arranged by Jordanians against terrorism, stated that the attacks "targeted anti Islamic centers and favorite sites for the USA and Israeli intelligence members." Undoubtedly, this statement cannot improve the image of the group in view of its huge blunder and lack of logic.Referring back to the third conclusion of the Amman attacks regarding the "Al-Zarqawi group's surplus of power," it is definitely not a positive one since that power can be used to harm soft civilian targets in many countries. And "surplus of power" here means what the group has in terms of suicide persons, arms, and logistical capability as embodied in training, transportation, accommodation, preparations, coordination, and communications. All these were available outside the Iraqi borders (the main battlefield that needs all the available abilities) and were used in attacks that one cannot imagine having rational objectives behind them, even from the view of Al-Zarqawi's greatest sympathizers or the extreme opponents of the Jordanian policies.
In fact, the November attacks in Amman represent, in many ways, a point of departure. The attacks are the severest that have hit the Jordanian capital in history, and they will surely be highly effective in rallying the public and governmental efforts against terrorism in Jordan. These attacks will certainly enhance the international and regional coordination efforts against terrorism and reduce the emphasis on the international and regional factors that feed that sympathy, especially those related to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the Israeli practices against the Palestinians.Whether the Amman blasts came as a result of "surplus of power" in Al-Zarqawi's group, or to achieve certain goals inside Jordan, or due to strategic mistake, or tactical error, it is clear that recruiting Iraqi suicide attackers, directing them to carry out operations in a capital known for its high security measures, and launching attacks leading to many victims, are factors that should increase caution and hasten the efforts to develop regional and international strategies and mechanisms to combat the terrorist attacks in their different phases.
Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism - A New report by The International Crisis Group...
A good reading for the weekend...Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi IslamismMiddle East Report N°47 23
November 2005
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
For access to the full report (23 PAGES)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3801EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The horrifying 9 November 2005 suicide attacks against three hotels in Amman -- with a toll of 60 dead and over 100 wounded -- drove home two important messages. No security apparatus, however efficient, can prevent each and every attack by a person prepared to die as they kill others. And any security response must be complemented by a genuine opening of the political system and more equally shared economic opportunity if Jordan is to minimise the risk of further attacks and instability. In the identity of their perpetrators and the background of their apparent mastermind, the attacks spoke volumes about Jordan's predicament. They were carried out by Iraqis, who were angered by events in their country, had arrived in the Kingdom only days earlier and chose America's close ally in the region as the target for their revenge. And they reportedly were masterminded by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadi commander fighting in Iraq who elicits a measure of domestic sympathy insofar as he gives voice to popular hostility toward U.S. policy and alienation toward the country's Westernised elite.
Feeding on disaffection with a government that has failed to address basic needs and maintains an unpopular alliance with the U.S., violent Islamist militants have flourished of late. As in most other Middle East and North African countries, the victorious return of those who fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan led to the creation of a domestic jihadi Salafi movement in the early 1990s.
Having encouraged the spread of traditional, peaceful Salafism to balance an increasingly Palestine-oriented Muslim Brotherhood, the regime was ill-prepared to deal with the arrival of these radicalised young men who turned Salafism on its head by giving it a violent bent.The security services at first kept jihadis in check. But over time, their elastic reach and
the introduction of more repressive laws generated new frustrations and renewed interest in radical agendas. The last few years in particular have seen
growing public criticism of a leadership that allied itself with the West at a time of intense anti-Americanism and failed both to deliver anticipated economic dividends to anyone but the elites and to implement promised political reforms. Lack of representation and participation, combined with a shortage of economic opportunities, fed into a romanticised notion of jihad that has sent a steady trickle of young men across the border to join the fight against the U.S. and its perceived proxies in Iraq. Others, it appears from recent events, remain in Jordan, where they can lay the groundwork for suicide attacks carried out by non-Jordanians who slip across the border and reach their targets before the security services get wind of them.
The hotel attacks produced strong but likely temporary revulsion against jihadi terrorism, and the regime has understandably reacted by announcing tougher security measures, but these cannot suffice and, without other, more proactive steps, may well backfire. Besides anger at U.S. regional policies and the monarchy's acquiescence in them,
sympathy for the jihadis has its roots in an overly constricted political system, growing economic inequality, shrinking opportunities and anger at widespread corruption. For years, the regime has promised an ambitious reform program. The time has come for it to implement this at home with the same ardour with which it advertises it abroad. A three-pronged strategy is needed, addressing political, economic and cultural challenges. RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
Political measures. The regime should take advantage of its current popular support resulting from outrage at the bombings to:
(a)
review laws and decisions that curtail political freedoms and, where necessary amend or -- as in the specific case of the draft professional associations law -- abandon them;(b)
draft a new electoral law providing a more accurate popular representation; and
(c)
form a broader, more inclusive government coalition incorporating opposition tendencies in order to carry out these political reforms and implement the proposed National Agenda, including the long-awaited new electoral law.2.
Economic measures. The regime should expand opportunities for the poor and unemployed to share more fairly and fully in Jordan's real growth by taking urgent steps to:
(a)
remove obstacles to job creation and provide job training and skill building programs;
(b)
cushion hardships for the least fortunate;(c)
provide start-up financing and low-cost administrative support for small entrepreneurial efforts; and(d)
attack corruption more strongly.3.
Cultural measures. The regime should seek to drive a wedge between jihadi and non-jihadi Islamists, by acting to:
(a)
promote a tolerant version of Islam in all educational institutions;
(b)
launch an ideological campaign against fitna (discord) among Muslims; and
(c)
provide genuine space for credible, competent, independent preachers and religious teachers who denounce violence -- including those who are critical of government policy -- to debate Salafi ideologues.
Very depressing news... Extremists 'hijack Islam's image'
For more information, you can check their website athttp://www.islamperceptions.org/Extremists 'hijack Islam's image'By Peter Feuilherade BBC Monitoring, in Amsterdam
The West's image of Islam has been hijacked by extremists, delegates at the recent News Xchange broadcasting conference in Amsterdam heard.
Debate was prompted by
the results of a Kuwaiti government survey that found the depiction of Muslims in the US and European media was "typically stereotypical and negative".
Several speakers concluded that the role of the media should be to understand and illustrate the complexity of the Islamic world, rather than dealing in such generalisations.
'Widespread ignorance' The session began with Chris Yalonis of Communique Partners presenting the findings of a new international survey, "Western perceptions about Islam and Muslims", which he carried out on behalf of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments) and Islamic Affairs.
Things are being done in the name of religion, but it's not good enough for the media to describe them simply as Islamic Phil Harding, BBC World Service
He said there was a paradox between the perception by many Europeans of their Muslim neighbours and colleagues as "good people", while Muslims they see on television are often depicted as "terrorists".
Between March and August 2005 the survey team carried out more than 2,400 online interviews in Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. Their findings included:
- Muslims rated lowest in overall favourability among various religious groups.
- Ignorance of and lack of empathy with Islam is widespread.
- The portrayal of Arabs and Muslims varies according to the type of media, "but it is typically stereotypical and negative, although improving especially in certain prestigious news organisations".
- TV documentaries and news are the most influential media in influencing feelings about Arab Muslims, followed by newspapers.
- Nearly three-quarters of respondents believe that the media depicts Arab Muslims and Islam accurately only half the time, not often or never.
Trevor Mostyn, an analyst of European media interviewed by the survey team, said:
"
Television loves the image of the ugly, ferocious blood-curdling Muslims." Articulate, "mainstream" Muslims are rarely seen on TV in Britain, Mostyn asserted.
Heated debateThe News Xchange session on "Reporting Islam" saw a passionate debate during which some Arab journalists complained that Muslims were frequently demonised in the Western media, while many European broadcasters stressed the need to avoid using inflammatory terms and to give airtime to moderate voices as well as extremists.
Abdul Bari Atwan, editor of the London-based paper al-Quds al-Arabi, complained of the West's coverage of the Muslim world, saying that when radical groups "hijacked" Islam, Western media simplistically depicted this as "Muslim terrorism".
He added: "
Whatever we do, we are still rejected by the West... As a Muslim in Europe, which is supposed to be the continent of human rights, I am really frightened."
Wadah Khanfar, managing director of al-Jazeera, said many media and correspondents failed to differentiate between the Muslim religion and cultural tradition. He too agreed: "We should abandon simplistic coverage."
Feelings ran high when Ayan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born Dutch MP whose criticism of Islam sent her into hiding after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, spoke. She accused Arab journalists of seeing all problems as caused by some outside force, and said they should engage in more self-reflection.
Her remarks that "
there is a total lack of freedom in the Arab and Islamic world", as well as "a lack of equality for and a culture of violence towards women", provoked angry denials and denunciations from many Arab and other journalists in the hall.
"Things are being done in the name of religion, but it's not good enough for the media to describe them simply as Islamic," concluded Phil Harding of BBC World Service, summing up what emerged as the majority consensus after a very heated discussion.
Index ranks Middle East freedom... We still score low and we are behind Palestine and Iraq - Two states under occupation... WALLA HARAM
Index ranks Middle East freedomBBC ONLINE
There is a wide range of democratisation across the Middle East, a survey by a leading research and advisory firm has found.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked 20 countries on 15 indicators of political and civil liberty. The Index of Political Freedom lists Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories as the most democratic parts of the region.
Libya received the lowest rating, below Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Reform resisted
The EIU scored each country on a 10-point scale, awarding one point for the least political freedom and 10 for the most.
INDEX OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
Israel: 8.20
Lebanon: 6.55
Morocco: 5.20
Iraq: 5.05
Palestine: 5.05
Kuwait: 4.90
Tunisia: 4.60
Jordan: 4.45 (We can say that we are in the same league with Egypt, Sudan & Yemen)
Qatar: 4.45
Egypt: 4.30
Sudan: 4.30
Yemen: 4.30
Algeria: 4.15
Oman: 4.00
Bahrain: 3.85
Iran: 3.85
UAE: 3.70
Saudi Arabia: 2.80
Syria: 2.80
Libya: 2.05
Source: EIU
The analysts found little evidence of democratisation in some countries. Sitting at the bottom of the table, Libya has long had a reputation as one of the world's worst violators of human rights.
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's government has also long restricted freedom of expression and independent political activity.
Saudi Arabia held its first ever exercise in democracy in February 2005 when it held municipal elections, but remains an absolute monarchy that has resisted pressure for reform.
Syria, meanwhile, is renowned for its authoritarian rule even though there has been a degree of liberalisation under President Bashar al-Assad.
Progress
Though there are few surprises at the bottom of the table, the top five may raise eyebrows.
It contains three of the most volatile parts of the region: Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq.
FREEDOM INDICATORS
Election of head of government
Election of parliament
Fairness of electoral laws
Right to organise political parties
Power of elected representatives
Presence of an opposition
Transparency
Minority participation
Level of corruption
Freedom of assembly
Independence of the judiciary
Press freedom
Religious freedom
Rule of law
Property rights
Source: EIU
BBC Middle East analyst Roger Hardy says there is unquestionably a new mood in the region, but progress has been uneven.
Lebanon is free in a very particular sense: it is no longer under military occupation. Most Palestinians do not enjoy that freedom, and yet they have just had local elections and are preparing for parliamentary ones in January, our correspondent says.
As for Iraq, its high score is a bit surprising, given the level of violence there, our correspondent says.
Iraqis no long live under a dictatorship and now have plenty of publications and political parties to choose from. But their freedom of movement is constrained by the bombings and kidnappings, and that is a big limitation.
King has more friends in West than at home by ROBERT FISK...
A Very critical article by Fisk in the Independent...I never thought that Fisk had such strong feelings and opinions against the jordanian monarchy, any comments?!King has more friends in West than at home
By
Robert FiskTHE INDEPENDENT
Friday, 11th November 2005
It was a bloody, cruel message to the Plucky Little King Mark II. Help the Americans, train their Iraqi policemen, entertain their special forces officers and you will be a new target of al-Qa’ida. Not that new, of course. A US embassy employee, Laurence Foley, the softest of targets because he loved the Middle East and lived at home in Amman, was killed three years ago.
But 56 dead, most of them Jordanians, is a devastating blow to the man who once ran the supposedly "elite" Jordanian special forces and who is King of that little sandpit Winston Churchill created and called "Jordan".
And who was to blame? Why Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, of course. The same tiresome, odd, ruthless, nebulous Zarqawi who the Americans seem as little able to capture or kill as they do Osama bin Laden, or Mullah Omar, or, for that matter, Radovan Karadjic and Ratko Mladic, the war criminals who butchered the Muslims of Srebrenica and other cities in Bosnia.
The suicide bombings that killed 56 innocents in Amman bore in that cliche beloved of all journalists, "all the hallmarks" , of al-Qa’ida and Zarqawi. Why do we keep gifting these creatures with the attributes of silver?
If, that is, Zarqawi is alive. A petty criminal from the Jordanian city of Zarqa, he certainly existed in 2003 when the illegal invasion of Iraq was undertaken by the United States and Britain. But many in Iraq believe he died in the initial air attacks of that war. In Zarqa, his wife, of whom he was very possessive, has gone out to work to support her family. When his mother died last year, the family had no messages of condolence from Zarqawi, an odd omission from a man who has supposedly embraced so strict an interpretation of Islam.
Repeatedly, American intelligence officers have "identified" Zarqawi from videotapes depicting the murder of Western hostages. But the killers were always cowled in scarves, their voices distorted. How did the Americans know this was Zarqawi?
There are many unanswered questions about al-Qaida’s role in Iraq - and now in Jordan - which we journalists now prefer to leave alone. Why Jordan? Why now?
Well,
partly because King Abdullah is so loyal a servant of President George Bush. Partly because his forces are training Iraqi soldiers. Partly because he is allowing US special forces to train those soldiers on his soil. Partly because Jordan has also become a rear echelon air base for US fighter-bombers, which are attacking cities in Iraq. And partly because Jordan, with its unconstitutional monarchy and its growing slums of Islamists in its largest cities, is the soft underbelly of "the West" in the Middle East.
Since the death of his father, Jordanians and other Arabs have been asking whether the King can justify his existence in what was once called Transjordan."What is the King for?" I was asked not long ago in Jordan. A dangerous question, and every act of violence against his kingdom makes the question more ominous. Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel is as unpopular as ever inside the country. The Radisson Hotel, one of the targets of Wednesday night’s attacks, was often used by Israeli visitors to Jordan.
Because he is so popular in the West, because he speaks English better than he speaks Arabic, because he is the son of the Plucky Little King Mark I, King Hussein, because he was a graduate of Sandhurst, King Abdullah is a popular figure in Europe and America, welcome in Downing Street and the White House. But there are those in Jordan who do not wish him so well. Wednesday night’s attacks were a warning that the King might be safer in London than he is in Amman.
IT'S UP TO HUSSEIN'S SON TO SAVE KINGDOM BY URI DAN - THE NEW YORK POST
IT'S UP TO HUSSEIN'S SON TO SAVE KINGDOM
By URI DAN
THE NEW YORK POST, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2005
SUDDENLY, Jordan is in the eye of the terrorist storm — and it's up to King Abdullah to save the kingdom.
The king, who inherited the best security service of the Arab world from his father, King Hussein, is ready to wage a gloves-off war on al Qaeda. Those close to him expect a bloody battle.
"
I knew King Hussein, and I know King Abdullah," ex-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said. "
When the king was on his way to die, he chose Abdullah to succeed him not because he was more intelligent than the other princes but because he knew Prince Abdullah would be the toughest of them all if the moment arrived when the Hashemite Kingdom was in danger."
That danger comes from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al Qaeda chieftain from Zarga, Jordan, who orchestrated Wed- nesday night's synchronized attacks on three Amman hotels. In the past, Abdullah's security service had managed to uncover such plots, including one to attack Western tourists during the 2000 millennium celebrations at Christian holy places along the Jordan River. But some observers see laxity plaguing the secret service of late, allowing an al Qaeda support network in Jordan to help Zarqawi carry out the hotel bombings.
Abdullah has refrained — so far — from fighting Zarqawi with the brutal methods of his dad, who in 1970 crushed the Black September uprising of Palestinians hellbent on overthrowing him.
"
Jordan is a controlled democracy now," an Israeli intelligence officer said yesterday. "
But if the king wants to strike against terrorists with what democracies call 'police state methods,' he would absolutely do it to save his throne." [ ]
Caught in the middle, as usual by THE ECONOMIST
Caught in the middle, as usualNov 11th 2005
The Economist
A co-ordinated terrorist attack on three hotels in Amman shows that Jordan is not the oasis of calm it claims to be
THE vaunted tranquillity of Jordan amid the seemingly permanent instability afflicting its neighbours was bloodily interrupted on Wednesday November 9th by three bombs, probably set off suicidally, in posh hotels frequented by westerners, Israelis and the Jordanian elite in the capital, Amman. First reports said that the blasts, in the Grand Hyatt, the Radisson and the Days Inn hotels, killed at least 57 people and wounded around 100. The Jordanian assumption—bolstered by a claim on the internet—was that al-Qaeda was responsible.
But it is easy to guess. Jordan is a vital regional ally of the United States, which promotes and bolsters the country and its 43-year-old king, Abdullah, who succeeded his late father, Hussein, six years ago, as a showpiece of economic and political progress and globalisation. With only 5m people and wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia ("the neighbours from hell", as the king has privately called them), Jordan is now the world's fourth-biggest recipient of American aid.
It has also become a hub for western diplomats, businessmen, aid agencies and military people going in and out of Iraq. Moreover, Amman is the main meeting-point for expatriate Iraqis, some 400,000 of whom are reckoned to live there, some connected to the old regime and the insurgency, others to the new order struggling to assert itself. Several hundred Jordanians, including the arch-terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who claims the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq, are probably fighting against the Americans across the border.
The Jordanian king took a gamble in 2003 by deciding to back the Americans in their invasion of Iraq—unlike his father, who remained neutral during the first Gulf war against Iraq in 1991, to Saddam Hussein's delight and the Americans' intense displeasure. But, despite the consequent increase in American largesse, King Abdullah's decision was generally disliked by his citizens, over half of whom are of Palestinian origin: they loathe what they see as America's bias towards Israel. Most of Jordan's so-called East Bankers (ie, those who are not Palestinian) are equally hostile to American policy, sympathising strongly with the "resistance" by their Sunni co-religionists against the new Shia-dominated order in Iraq. The most popular political party in Jordan according to opinion polls, though far from being the choice of the majority, is the Islamic Action Front, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and an admirer of the Islamists of Hamas in Israel.
However, the bombings in Amman have been greeted by widespread anger in Jordan and the wider Arab world. Rallies against them were held on Friday in the Jordanian capital, and a number of groups, including the Islamic Action Front, called on their followers to hold further marches.
Apparently taken aback by this hostile response, the group that had claimed responsibility for the attack issued a further (unverified) statement justifying the atrocity on the grounds that the hotels had been used as bases for waging war on Islam.
Tribal troublesEven if most of his countrymen stand behind him in condemning the bombs, King Abdullah has other problems. He has been backing a strongly liberal economic policy, which has annoyed the old tribal conservatives on whom the Hashemite monarchy has depended since it was installed by the British 80-plus years ago. Seeming to answer the Americans' appeal for more democratisation in the Middle East, he launched
an ambitious "national agenda" earlier this year which, he said, would "lead the country into a new age where there is more press freedom, health insurance for all, an independent judiciary, a more politically active public, political pluralism, active and powerful parties with clear-cut platforms, and empowered women and youth." One recommendation expected to be made by the committees which have been elaborating the national agenda is for a new electoral law that would give Palestinians fairer representation in parliament. That would annoy the old guard too.As a former senior minister puts it, "
he's trying to take Jordan out of the region's mentality." But the king has met resistance across the spectrum. "
We cannot afford shocks," says the former minister. In the summer, the king's favourite moderniser, Bassam Aawadallah, an ardent liberal economist, was forced out as finance minister, partly for being too abrasive.
For all the talk of modernisation and political pluralism, Jordan is still a politely authoritarian state run by a king whose near-absolute power is underpinned by a ruthless and watchful security service. His reforms are being imposed from the top down. The press, though it breathes a bit more freely, is co-opted and still occasionally muzzled. A recent poll by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan found that 77% of respondents felt they could not "criticise the government without fearing punishment", against only 16% who thought they could."
The perpetrators of this week's bombs will be hunted down without mercy; dozens have been arrested already, including some Iraqis. All the same, the young king knows he must be careful. Too fierce a bout of repression could backfire. Beneath its amiable surface, Jordan hosts many dangerously competing tensions.
The Terrorist attacks on our beloved country, AL Urdun…
The Terrorist attacks on our beloved country, AL Urdun…
I, as most people of our beloved country Jordan, is still in shock by the cowardly and barbaric acts of terrorism which clearly demonstrated the terrible cruelty of the terrorists and the great toll they take on civilised society.
I am of the firm belief that there can be no justification for this pointless destruction….Jordan will not be deterred by the devastation that terrorist madness has provoked... among innocent people. We all will stand together in this battle against the scourge of terrorism.
My thoughts go to the families and friends of the many who have been murdered or injured in such indiscriminate attacks.
…I have decided to refrain from posting pics of the attacks or the demonstrations, which has been covered exclusively by my fellow Jordanian bloggers, and decided to post articles and op-eds from the international press that concerns the events of the past couple of days…
Plans for reform in Jordan must overcome scepticism BY SHARMILA DEVI - The financial Times
Plans for reform in Jordan must overcome scepticismBy Sharmila Devi
THE FINANCIAL TIMES
November 3 2005 16:51
Amman is bustling with the human overspill from neighbouring Iraq, with burly western security contractors, aid workers and Iraqi exiles filling the hotels and shopping malls.
Gulf investors with oil money to burn, and other Arabs seeking a safe haven out of troubled Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere in the region are rushing to capitalise on cheap property prices and a booming stock market.
Jordan is again making the most out of its historic role as a safe buffer state in a bad neighbourhood.Beneath the glitz and impressive growth figures lie long-simmering problems for the energy-scarce country of less than 6m people – a worrisome budget deficit, high poverty levels, widespread dissatisfaction over close relations with Washington and popular empathy with the neighbouring Palestinians.The government is soon due to reveal its “National Agenda” – a 10-year plan of ambitious political and economic reforms that have been talked about since King Abdullah came to the throne in 1999. Compiled by officials from both the private and public sectors and civil society, many Jordanians are already cynical about the exercise, given the opposition to change by many in the rich, ruling elite.
Marwan Muasher, deputy prime minister who headed the agenda’s steering committee, acknowledges the challenge. “
Most of the public started being sceptical about this, not because they’re not with reform but because they’re not sure the government means what it says and they’re not sure there’s a policy commitment to this programme,” he said.
“
The National Agenda is an effort that will show people that yes, we will pass through two very difficult years but that we have a well-thought out, measurable programme that would not just get rid of the chronic problems that we have in our budget but result in a doubling of people’s incomes in 10 years.”
He said that for the first time in the Arab world, reform would be tied to performance indicators, a timeframe and budgetary allocations. Reports would be published on the reforms, which make an impressive list. They include a long-discussed electoral law to introduce party lists as part of an effort to lessen tribalism and patronage in political life, remove all legal discrimination against women, bring in universal health insurance and cut the unemployment rate by about half to 6.8 per cent in the next 10 years. Singapore and Ireland have been studied as role models, said Mr Muasher.
But critics say parliament retains the power to dilute any changes, even if the king continues regulary to postpone its sessions. They say the intelligence services provide a safe and secure environment, but at the expense of stifling outspokenness in a country where much of the press imposes self-censorship on issues such as the royal family, the ruling classes or corruption.
“
The king is trying to bring new blood into the government and that’s to be welcomed but the old guard is a real monster and it’s hard to get rid of it,” said one analyst. “
All this talk of reform is very positive but it’s going to take a lot of time.”
On the economic front, Jordanians do speak of a sense of optimism after having weathered regional shocks such as the Palestinian intifada and the 2003 Iraq war. Gross domestic product is set to grow by more than 7 per cent again this year after registering growth of 7.5 per cent in 2004, up from only 4 per cent the previous year.
But high oil prices, coupled with the receipt of only around half the fuel subsidies forecast from rich Gulf states, has forced the government to raise fuel prices twice this year. The budget deficit risks overshooting the target 3.3 per cent of GDP to more than 8 per cent, say analysts.
Umayya Toukan, governor of the Central Bank of Jordan, said he was confident that the deficit would be controlled through a combination of measures. These include a phasing out of fuel subsidies by 2007, fiscal reforms and rising revenue collection and accelerated privatisation efforts.
For this year, he spoke of an inflation rate of between 3 and 4 per cent after having managed to keep it between 2 and 3 per cent for the past two years.
Mr Toukan said reforms would help to bring down the jobless rate.
