The Jordanian experience (in Media and reform) - by Amy Henderson
The Jordanian experience by Amy Henderson
bitterlemons-international.org - Middle East roundtable Media and reform
May 26, 2005, 2005 Volume 3 Edition 19
Jordan's "new era" has been filled with ambiguities and inconsistent policies toward the media that find their roots in Jordan's political structure.
Historically, the media interests of the monarchy and those of a conservative establishment that supported it were, for the most part, one and the same. Now they no longer necessarily coincide. Since King Abdullah II ascended to the throne, inconsistencies in media policy have derived from a battle of wills between the country's liberal reformers, who want to see a reorganization of the social bases of power and a deepening of economic reform, and status quo conservatives.
The king and a small coterie of advisors and officials seem frequently torn between the impulses of both. For the sake of the country's long-term stability, the regime advocates reform. At the same time, there is a prevailing concern that too much reform--especially during times of crisis--could facilitate destabilization. Consequently, Abdullah at times has led the charge toward greater openness only to be blocked by the establishment, and at other moments retreated, appearing in lock step with conservatives.The first four years of the king's reign were replete with instances in which establishment conservatives successfully blocked media reform initiatives. Abdullah urged the government to open the country to media investments, apparently to attract some of the Europe-based Arab satellite business to Jordan. Advocates of the idea cited three possible advantages: to draw high-tech, capital intensive industry to the country, to absorb excess human resources, and to create competition for local media, raising the standards of national journalism.
The government and parliament colluded to derail the project, however: issues as diverse as national security and pornography were drawn into the debate. A draft law written by an unenthusiastic government was shelved, and was anyway nothing to write home about. It delineated a media investment "zone": media based there would be free.
The Jordanian media, however, was not entitled to invest there, and consequently would remain subject to Jordan's restrictive press and publication law and the penal code. Parliament did not accept the government's distinction between Jordanian and foreign media, and expressed its anxiety about the pending loosening of social and moral codes should such a zone ever materialize. The project was shelved. A few months later, Dubai seized the idea as a component of its own high-tech drive. Media privatization has also been demonstrative of the regime's perplexity over how best to deal with the media.
In 2000, Abdullah recommended that the government divest from major newspapers. Several proposals were advanced and by May 2001 the "privatization" was complete. It involved the Jordan Press Foundation, in which the state relinquished 6.7 percent of its equity. Prior to the sale, the ownership structure was as follows: the government owned 15 percent of its shares through the Jordan Investment Corporation, JIC (the investment arm of the government), and 47 percent through the Social Security Corporation, SSC. The majority of JIC shares were purchased by the SSC, in effect a sale from the left hand to the right. Government ownership in the other major papers (30 percent of Al Dustour and 22 percent of Al Arab Al Yawm) has not changed and the equity of the fully government-owned Jordan Radio and Television and the Jordan News Agency, Petra, is not likely to see the auction block any time soon.
Efforts to reform the media sector have not only met resistance from establishment conservatives, but also from the media itself. Conservatives have traditionally benefited from state ownership of media. Appointments and positions in the media have been distributed as patronage: top appointments are often politically motivated, and less senior positions were often filled through the establishment network. This has facilitated the deterioration of professional journalism and an acceptance of mediocrity at some of the largest media institutions. Across-the-board reorganization and restructuring of the media threaten to reveal the weaknesses of unqualified personnel in the face of competition, as well as curb the establishment's ability to dominate public discourse and distribute patronage.
There are several independent weekly newspapers in circulation, mostly opposition papers, and one independent daily, Al Ghad, established in 2004.
However, the plethora of independent publications has not facilitated the media's mobilization. On the contrary, the Jordanian media is a house divided, and consequently, it cannot stand up to state pressure. The mainstream media frequently accuses the tabloid press of compromising professional credibility, while the opposition accuses the mainstream media of complicity with the regime.
Media reform has anyway been something of a moot point since September 11, an event that revealed the extent to which the regime still grapples with the national security conundrum. Temporary amendments to the penal code, subject to no parliamentary oversight, were swift and expanded the already vague limits on free expression delineated in the press and publications law. The amendments allowed courts to temporarily or permanently ban publications for publishing false information or rumors, aggravating social norms, inciting violence or hatred, or harming the honor or reputation of individuals. Offenders were threatened with three-year prison sentences, fines of some $7,000, or both.
The new amendments also expanded an article that criminalizes insulting the dignity of the king, and made such offenses eligible for trial in the state security court. Similar restrictions were already included in the law, which further prohibits the publication of any information or image that jeopardizes relations with friendly states, insults the head of friendly states, degrades religion or undermines the country's economic and fiscal stability.
In light of continuing Palestinian-Israeli violence and the US-led war on Iraq and continuing instability there, these restrictions were kept in place. The effects have been dramatic and have included the arrest and imprisonment of several journalists and the closure of media offices in Amman.
The local media has since complained of a lack of access to information and harassment from the authorities (including being summoned by the security services for questioning, unofficial threats, direct interference in work, official threats, and denial of entry into public activities). Last year, the government proposed amendments to the press and publications law that would forbid the arrest or imprisonment of journalists for press offenses and began drafting an access to information law, while journalists also cited a noticeable decline in interference by the authorities in their work and a drop in the detainment of journalists. But while overt repression has abated, there have been as yet no substantial changes to the difficult legal environment in which the media has always operated.
Compounding matters, the only institution that represents the media, the Jordan Press Association, has typically been an extension of the state's repressive media policy, not a shield against it. A journalist not a member in good standing of the JPA can be legally barred from working. However, it is often the JPA, not the government, that endeavors to apply this rule to the media. In fact, the government has in the past urged the JPA to curb its enthusiasm for harassing journalists: the JPA tried to take the government to court to force it to apply the law.
The liberal-conservative competition within and for the media is likely to re-ignite if Abdullah moves ahead with political reforms as he has promised to do later this year.
Nevertheless, the media may prove to be one of the most difficult sectors to reform. There is resistance from within, and, added to the fact that many Jordanians genuinely fear retaliation for speaking their minds openly, the media enjoys little credibility among the population. Few voices have been raised in opposition to frequent government crackdowns on the press in the last decade.Consequently, the reformers within may have difficulty in finding allies in civil society to take up the cudgels for a fully free and independent Jordanian press.Amy Henderson is a Middle East-based freelance journalist and the former national news editor of the Jordan Times.
Analysis: Jordan in crisis over power BY SANA ABDALLAH - Jordanian East Bankers Vs. Jordanians of Palestinian origion
Analysis: Jordan in crisis over powerBy Sana Abdallah
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
Amman, Jordan, May. 25 (UPI) -- As Jordan marks its 59th independence day Wednesday, it faces a deep crisis between the government of Prime Minister Adnan Badran and a large minority in parliament that has threatened to withhold confidence.
The formation of Badran's government last month did not so much divide the country as it resurfaced the unspoken sensitivities between East Bank Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin, with the first group using the so-called threat of absorbing or settling the Palestinians as an excuse for what it sees as the second gaining too much power.
At issue is that Badran, a veteran academic, brought an unprecedented number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin into his Cabinet, while ignoring representatives from major tribes in southern Jordan. Around 12 of the 26-member government are Palestinians.
When he formed the government after King Abdullah designated him in early April, the new prime minister insisted he wanted a team that was capable of carrying out the monarch's instructions in speeding up administrative, political and economic reforms. Regional considerations were not on his agenda, as they clearly were not in the king's.
That was hard to swallow for around 48 parliamentarians, mostly pro-establishment, so-called "centrists," in the 110-seat lower house. These "new opposition" legislators, mostly elected on tribal basis and who have traditionally endorsed government laws and policies, quickly said they might not give Badran's government a vote of confidence.
In a memorandum, they specified opposition to the form, rather than the agenda, of the Cabinet, based on the fact that it had ignored representatives from certain areas in Jordan. They also objected to the economic team, most of whose members were ministers in the previous government of former Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez.
They complained the economic team, which the king believes would speed up reforms, had failed not only in improving the standard of living in the country, but increased taxation and hiked prices of commodities. The legislators also accused these ministers of not responding to parliament demands on a fair distribution of funds from foreign assistance.
The legislators have been mostly protesting against renaming Bassem Awadallah as finance minister after he had resigned as planning minister two months earlier following a series of complaints and accusations that he was too "autonomous" in his decisions on where foreign assistance was going.
Others saw the campaign against Awadallah, 41, as being motivated by the fact that he does not hail from a prominent Jordanian tribe, but from a Palestinian family.
The "new opposition" made no mention of what appears to be really bothering them: The inclusion of so many Palestinians, who continue to make up more than half of Jordan's 5.4 million population, in the economic and political decision-making hierarchy. As one commentator put it in the independent al-Ghad daily this week, these very same parliamentarians had no problem with al-Fayez's former Cabinet when it excluded some of the regions in Jordan, mainly because it had a "tribal" base. The writer explained that these parliamentarians were opposed to the individuals in this new government, rather than policies that interest the general public.
While these MP's never came right out to complain about the number of Palestinians in Badran's government, they have privately complained in their so-called political salons the issue of "absorbing" or "settling" the Palestinians. In other words, giving the Palestinians more political power at the expense of the "tribes," who have traditionally been the players in the executive branch while the Palestinians have constituted the business and private sector community.
The parliamentary uproar stems from the view that the new government team is set to "absorb" the Palestinians, thus giving up their right to return to homes they were forced to flee in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war when the Jewish state was established. The legislators see this being done as a result of pressure from Washington, a close Jordanian ally and main donor.
Analysts privately say that by bringing in so many Palestinians in positions of power, these pro-establishment MP's are very nervous about changing the status quo, citing the right-wing Israeli threat of making Jordan the "alternative Palestinian homeland."
What added to their worries that this scheme was being implemented is an interior ministry decision that removed travel restrictions on Palestinians coming to Jordan from the West Bank as of Wednesday. The ministry decided that West Bank Palestinians no longer had to obtain the "no-objection" paper to enter the country, which was imposed at the start of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000 for fear the people would leave their towns for safety and livelihood in Jordan; thus, leaving their property for the Israelis to confiscate.
King Abdullah has made clear his support for his government team. He told the London-based al-Hayat daily last week that he gave no importance to the origins of the ministers, something he might not have realized shakes the very foundations of the socio-political status quo in his kingdom.
"When they were chosen, I don't believe their origins were not taken into consideration," the king said. "It is not right to look at individuals as having come at the expense of others."
Abdullah, whose wife Queen Rania is of Palestinian origin, insisted it was the government's program, not the individuals that should be judged and stressed that "all in Jordan should benefit" from reforms that he said was a "choice not linked to individuals." He also said that reform and "political and economic participation" of all in the country would not divide the kingdom and saw no link between reform and "settlement" (of Palestinians).
While King Abdullah's firm and clear declared support to his new government may embarrass the traditional legislators into accepting Badran's team and not withhold confidence if there is a vote, they might not make the executive branch's work easy if they are not given something else in return to silence them.
Although parliament is in recess and expected to convene in an extraordinary session in September, the king, who sets date and agenda for extraordinary sessions, is unlikely to include a confidence vote in the agenda to avoid spending too much time on the issue and to deal with legislation.
But Badran recently told the independent al-Arab al-Yawm local daily he intended to seek a vote of confidence in an apparent attempt to obtain legitimacy for reform programs he has in store.
Analysts say the parliamentary uproar has highlighted a defective and controversial general elections law that brought a conservative, tribal majority that is hindering the king's vision for deep-rooted reforms. Such reforms necessarily mean a significant shift in the way the country has been run in the past 50-plus years, giving Jordanians of Palestinian origin political power in the decision-making process that could be at the expense of the traditional East Bankers losing that political grip.
Achieving reforms that include such a shift has not been an easy task in the past six years since King Abdullah assumed the Hashemite throne. It is not likely to be a smooth ride now.
Democratic Jordan: enticing, but still not a done deal By Rami G. Khouri
A Brilliant Artciel by Rami Khoury that puts the onus on the Jordanian Leadership
'King Abdullah has again set a high bar of expectations against which his people and his friends abroad will judge him in the months and years ahead'Democratic Jordan: enticing, but still not a done dealBy Rami G. Khouri
TEH DAILY STAR
Wednesday, May 25, 2005
When Jordan's King Abdullah II closed the three-day World Economic Forum on Sunday at a new convention center along the Dead Sea coast, he urged regional leaders to respond to popular demand for economic and political reforms, saying: "
People want to move forward, they want meaningful reform, they want to see a tangible difference in their lives."
What he did not say, but seems to have felt, as evidenced by his words and some recent actions, was that ordinary Arab people also wanted their leaders to match their rhetoric with action. King Abdullah to some extent has brought on himself some of the pressures he has felt recently. A string of recent newspaper articles around the world, coupled with increasingly frank private criticisms from foreign officials, diplomats, academics, journalists,
and other genuine friends, shocked but also caught the attention of the Jordanian leadership, especially that many of the critics were loyal sons and daughters of the country.The main thrust of the criticism has been that Jordanian political realities do not match the king's boastful depictions of his own realm as a democratic model for other Arabs. Had Jordan not marketed itself as an exemplary Arab state, it could probably have avoided the cross examination and merrily went on its way in the tradition of cruise-control one-party autocracies, like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.
The main criticisms at home and abroad have focused on several fronts.
First has been the government's attempts to legislate an end to the political role of perhaps the most genuine political institutions in the country - the professional associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers and others.
Critics have also bemoaned the intelligence department's interference in fields that seem to have little if anything to do with genuine security, such as the mass media, education, or bureaucratic appointments. Fighting corruption has been a problematic area, given that the anti-corruption unit is inside the intelligence department, which recently has been linked with, or accused of, corruption and influence peddling. Another problem is the pattern of general mediocrity in governance, with recent senior officials often talking like modern democrats but acting like Early Bronze Age patriarchs.
The gap between Jordan's lofty democratic rhetoric and its erratically democratic record had grown wide in recent years, and King Abdullah felt he had to act because the criticisms were clearly gnawing at his personal credibility, not to mention the country's overall image. He moved decisively recently on three fronts. He appointed a new government headed by Prime Minister Adnan Badran that was mandated to push forward the reform process.
He replaced his intelligence department director, who had expressed displeasure with the reform push. And
he revamped the royal palace senior staff, bringing in a team of proven reformers whose task is to drive and monitor the democratization process throughout the entire government.Diplomatic sources in Amman say privately that "this is crunch time for the king, who has to prove if his rhetoric of democracy and reform will be matched by the conduct of the government and its agencies." Official sources deeply involved in the changes under way explain this as something of a relaunch of the reform and democratization process, which initially took off in 1989 and has included five general elections for Parliament since that year. Jordan's liberalization in the period 1989-93 was indeed pioneering for the Arab world, in elections, integrating Islamists into the power structure, and opening up the media and civil society. The process slowed down in 1994 when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, and it has stagnated or regressed slightly in recent years.
Officials at the highest level privately complain of two reasons for the slow pace of change: a skeptical public, and the tendency of vested interests in Parliament and the bureaucracy to oppose deep changes. One sign of resistance to change has been a spirited public and private attack against the new government by parliamentarians, some political and press personalities and even some former security officers. Public apathy is also a home-grown problem: a system that liberalized to give its citizens greater rights of speech and assembly, without giving them real power to check government and security excesses, naturally bred widespread complacency and doubt.
King Abdullah has again set a high bar of expectations against which his people and his friends abroad will judge him in the months and years ahead.
When he says, as he did Sunday, that "people want meaningful reform, they want to see a tangible difference in their lives," he is right. But
will his actions match his words more closely this time around?His most urgent priority now is to start making those changes in governance that will foster genuine equality, accountability, transparency, rule of law, and participatory democracy. Perhaps he has started, with the changes at the top of the government, the intelligence department and the palace.
There are many other changes that can be made quickly, and that would "make tangible differences in people's lives," including: fostering greater transparency in all state and government financial accounts, creating credible mechanisms for citizen complaints, establishing civilian-government joint councils for oversight and coordination of police-and-security-related activities, consulting Parliament earlier on policy changes, enhancing the independence of the judiciary from executive branch influence, opening the field for private-sector electronic media, fostering opportunities for private think tanks and research institutions, studying how to create a more representative Parliament, and leaving the business of human rights compliance to the courts and civil society organizations.
Jordan as a democratic model for the Arab world remains an enticing prospect, and a very realizable possibility, but it is not yet a done deal. A lot of people, including its own, are cheering for it to succeed, so that there may indeed be a home-grown Arab reform strategy that breeds a credible democracy.
Rami G. Khouri writes a weekly commentary for The Daily Star.
Jordan: Democracy at a Dead End by Shadi Hamid
Jordan: Democracy at a Dead EndShadi Hamid
Arab Reform Bulletin
Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Translated by Dar Al-Watan for Journalism, Printing and Publishing.
May 2005, Volume 3, Issue 4
In a March 15th interview, ABC news anchor Peter Jennings asked King Abdullah II if Jordan would ever become a constitutional monarchy. “Absolutely,” the king said. When Abdullah came to power in 1999, there was widespread speculation that this young, charismatic Sandhurst and Georgetown-educated leader—and other young monarchs in the region—would be willing to embark on reforms and gradually share power. Yet, as of late, it has been non-monarchical systems such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt that have begun to experience democratic openings.
Jordan, on the other hand, has witnessed a disturbing wave of de-liberalization.First, there was the recent professional associations debacle, another manifestation of the struggle for the soul of a nation caught between its growing Palestinian majority and its close relationship with the United States.
In a country with notoriously impotent political parties,
a civil society with little grassroots reach, and a parliament dominated by pro-regime tribalism, the 120,000 professional associations have become the primary venue for opposition to Jordan's controversial foreign policies—and apparently an intolerable annoyance to a government eager to demonstrate its usefulness to Washington.
Enter Interior Minister Samir Habashneh. Catching civil society off guard with a series of harsh statements in January 2005, he demanded that the associations “completely halt” all political activities. Demonstrations and sit-ins were banned, while the Professional Associations Council was ordered to remove political banners from its premises. Amman governor Abdul Karim Malahmeh announced that “any kind of event, gathering or meeting, save for weddings, should obtain prior approval.”
In early March, the government presented a draft professional associations law to parliament, requesting it be acted upon urgently.
Most observers believe this 26-article bill would constitute a debilitating setback for democratization. It authorizes the Audit Bureau, for example, to monitor associations' funds to ensure they are spent only on internal activities. The draft law also changes voting procedures so that the professional councils are elected indirectly through “intermediary commissions.” To eliminate any doubt about the government's intentions, Habashneh stated openly that the law aimed to eliminate the “prevalence of one current”—meaning Islamists—within the associations.
The opposition launched a vigorous response, calling on parliament to fight the bill. Fifty-nine Members of Parliament (MPs) signed a memo asking that the government withdraw the draft, although nearly 20 withdrew their signatures, apparently due to government pressure.
Several journalists went on record as saying that the government pressed newspapers to refrain from publishing news about the crisis. Adding yet more tension to an already volatile situation,
the government also proposed a new political parties law. The law prohibits the use of mosques, clubs, professional associations, or sports clubs for political party activities, bans recruiting and campaigning at educational institutions, and bars activities that could harm Jordan's relations with other countries.
With its knack for offending friends and foes alike, Prime Minister Fayez's government fell in April and Habashneh lost his job.
At least temporarily, the brakes were put on Jordan's frightening skid toward full-blown authoritarianism. The king reaffirmed his country's commitment to political reform and promised that the new cabinet's policies would be in line with Jordan's ambitious 10-year national agenda. Yet there remains reason to be skeptical. Newly appointed Prime Minister Adnan Badran has used a less confrontational tone than his predecessor, but has not yet withdrawn either the professional associations law or the political parties law. Moreover,
while his cabinet is filled with Western-educated technocrats and private-sector reformers, few are known for their love of democracy. Badran's cabinet has come under unprecedented attack. MPs are angry that they were not consulted before its formation, and even regime loyalists accused Badran of neglecting the country's southern regions in his appointments. Thus far, 45 out of 110 MPs have said they will withhold confidence from the government; 17 from the Islamic bloc are expected to join them when it comes to a vote.
In response to the growing criticism, both the king and Badran have recited
vague platitudes about Jordan's ambitious plans for reform. But
while the king appears well intentioned, his focus on improving government performance and efficiency misses the mark. The real impediments to democracy lie in Jordan's political structure and anachronistic constitution which, among other things, ensures that the king is “immune from any liability and responsibility.” With his vast powers, the king also appoints the prime minister and all 40 members of the Senate, whose approval is needed for any proposed bill to become law.
By any standard, Jordan is nowhere close to joining the ranks of the world's democracies and remains, in form and function, an absolute monarchy—a fact emphasized by the latest political crises. In his interview with Peter Jennings, King Abdullah claimed that Jordan was on its way to becoming a constitutional monarchy.
The heavy-handed government actions of recent months, however, give ample reason for doubt.Shadi Hamid is a Fulbright Fellow in Amman, Jordan, conducting research on democratization and political Islam in the Arab world.
Democratizing Jordan by Rami Abdelrahman and Serene Al-Ahmad - JORDAN BUSINESS MONTHLY
The article below is a very good article on indicative basis although the two authors evidently lack expertise in writing political content but still a good first effort.
The following quotes/paragraph from the piece draw my attention especially emad Hajjaj's statement and I wanted to share their contents with all of you guys....
… Commenting on why he seems to have more freedom of expression than others, Mr. Hajjaj said, “
I draw caricatures; I have a unique way of expressing myself. I argue for my level of freedom, before I argue for my salary. But it happened gradually. It is a grave mistake for us to allow others to set limits on the freedom of our expression and creativity. This is a war and we have to fight it.”
… Although too extreme, this student echoes, to an extent, a general sentiment of political apathy in the Jordanian street. The lack of interest in politics could very well be a product of a lack of awareness. This is where political reform can play a critical role in educating people about the value of democracy and the importance of political participation.
… As it stands today, the street is alienated yet aching for change and that is why the government should act fast. Allowing greater freedom of _expression and press, the most basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by democracy, would not only seriously advance the democratization process in Jordan, but also enhance the government’s performance by bettering the monitoring process, and more importantly, actively engaging Jordanians in shaping their future.
… Talk of democratic reform is abound in the Middle East, and Jordan is no exception. The country is indeed viewed as the region’s pioneer in reform. And if that is to remain the case, Jordan should too walk the walk.Democratizing Jordan By Rami Abdelrahman and Serene Al-Ahmad
JORDAN BUSINESS MONTHLY
MAY 2005
As the momentum of reform in the region continues to press forward,
the path towards democracy in Jordan is still not clear-cut. It is ironic that more than 2,000 years ago, Amman, then known as Philadelphia, was one of the ten Greco-Roman Decapolis cities, where Athenian direct democracy was practiced.
Amman witnessed different forms of democracy through thousands of years and survived many tyrannies and dictatorships. Political reform, not just economic reform, was declared a top priority for the government, back in 2003, in His Majesty King Abdullah’s letter of designation to Prime Minister Faisal Al Fayez.
But can Jordan live up to its “role model” status in the region with its piecemeal reforms? And more importantly, what does democracy mean to the average Jordanian?“
Democracy is saying what you want to say, when you want to say it without fearing those in leather jackets and dark shades,” said a 20-year-old female student.
An overwhelming majority of Jordanians, when having to define democracy in their own words, say it is “freedom of expression”, rather than a form of government guaranteeing civil and political rights and freedoms. This is what Jordan Business Monthly (JBM) concluded after randomly surveying 200 people in Amman aged between 18 and 45.
The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 2004 takes the concept of democracy further, stating that
ensuring civil and political rights and freedoms alone does not constitute a democratic system. A democracy, the report states, ensures a broader freedom that “incorporates not only civil and political freedoms, including freedom from oppression, but also the liberation of the individual from all factors that are inconsistent with human dignity, such as hunger, disease, ignorance, poverty, and fear.” Despite their unclear understanding of democracy, 41% of Jordanians see Jordan as “democratic to some extent” (see Chart 1), but the majority seem to understand its value. According to our study, 38% of respondents think democracy is “very important” to the Jordanian society, 46% think it is “important”, 9% think it is “important to an extent”, 4% think it is “not important”, and 3% think it is “not important at all”.When asked to evaluate the democratization process in Jordan, 41% see it as “average” (see Chart 2), a finding which is consistent with a public opinion poll about democracy conducted by the Center of Strategic Studies (CSS) in 2004, which concluded that Jordanians think democracy in the Kingdom is “in the middle of the road”.The absence of freedom of expression and the absence of free press are the main obstacles to democracy in Jordan, Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) for the Middle East and North Africa, told JBM in a telephone interview. (JBM approached Deputy Prime Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Minister of Political Development Hisham Tal for an interview, but he declined.) Freedom of expression, including freedom of press, is the most basic of rights guaranteed by democracy.
“
There are unseen barriers to democracy such as the role of security forces in allowing freedom of expression, the biased role of media, and the shortage of true monitoring of the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities,” stated Mr. Taleb Saqqaf, assistant commissioner general of the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR).
Poverty, fear, ignorance, nepotism, tribalism, the governmental structure, and foreign interference, were frequently mentioned as obstacles to democracy by JBM’s respondents. In fact, only 16 people out of the 200 who filled JBM’s questionnaire did not fear providing their names. In 2004, the poll found, 81% of Jordanians believed that they could not publicly criticize the government or disagree with it without fearing governmental reprisal, a marginal decrease from 83% in 2003. The percentage was 70% in 1999.
The new government: Will we see a change? Apart from its slow pace of reforms and diplomatic mess-ups, the previous government left hard feelings growing in the parliament, professional associations, political parties, media, and civil society institutions. On April 5, 2005, King Abdullah commissioned the president of a private university, Dr. Adnan Badran, to form a new government,
replacing one that spent more time talking about political development than actually working to achieve it.“Aspirations exceed achievements,” the King said in his letter of designation to Dr. Badran, whose government’s main task is to institutionalize and accelerate reforms.
Fortunately,
the aspirations of the people are in accordance with the King’s directives to “open channels of communication between all political powers, and focus on participation and effective contribution of all segments of society to face its political, economic, and social challenges.”Allowing freedom of expression, improving living standards, and engaging Jordanian citizens in the decision making process were cited by JBM’s respondents as the most important steps the government should take in order to better achieve democracy. Dr. Badran’s government was quick to show its seriousness about political development by saying it is intending to withdraw the Professional Associations’ Draft Law, which has caused much controversy and garnered international reproach.
The law, which sought to silence the political voice of the professional associations, was described by HRW as “a major setback to Jordan’s earlier commitments to reform and to guaranteeing the rights of Jordanian activists and civil society to assemble and express their views freely,” according to a letter sent by the international watchdog to former Prime Minister Faisal Al Fayez. (HRW received no response to the letter from the government “so far”, as Ms. Whitson told JBM.) A government that presents such a law is “a government of political failure, not a government of political development,” said deputy Abdel-Karim Dughmi during a hot parliamentary debate over the law. The session ended with Parliament refusing to endorse the law and refusing to give it urgency status, as suggested by the government. As this issue goes to press, the Professional Associations Draft Law has been sidelined and no developments have taken place.
On another front, Dr. Badran has been trying to smooth over discontent in the Lower House by meeting deputies from the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the National Democratic Block, and the Badia, in his bid for a vote of confidence. 43 deputies have threatened vetoing the new government if it does not comply with their seven conditions, which include a “better” geographic representation (more ministers from the Southern Badia) and the dismissal of the ministers who contributed to the tension between deputies and the previous government. At press time, no vote of confidence has been granted to Dr. Badran’s government. But ultimately, the government is expected to win its vote of confidence, as is the case almost always.
But recently, the IAF, considered the main opposition party, demanded that dialogue with political powers should precede the formation of any new government, and not the other way around, according to the party’s secretary general Hamza Mansour. Article 35 of the Jordanian constitution states, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismissed them or accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.”
The government’s spokesperson and Minister of Culture Asma Khader said the government in Jordan is “elected by the people, because the parliament has the right to give it or deny it a vote of confidence.” Commenting on Ms. Khader’s statement, Mr. Mansour said, “The parliament itself is not truly representative of the people.”
I Vote Therefore I Care NotThe last parliamentary elections were held in June, 2003, under a 2001 temporary elections law that was passed by the previous parliament. The law reduced the eligible voting age from 19 to 18, gave every citizen the right to vote for only one candidate in his/her electoral district, raised the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 110, and allocated a quota for women made up of six parliamentary seats.
The 2003 election results saw a decisive victory for tribal candidates and non-liberals who won 84 parliamentary seats. Within this bracket, the IAF won 20 seats only, the poorest achievement in its political history. Leftist and nationalist political parties failed to win any seat in parliament, and none of the female candidates were able to win any seat beyond their allotted quota (the 54 female candidates had to compete among themselves for the 6-seat female quota). Out of the six women, one representing the IAF was elected, while the other five were independents.
The number of eligible voters for the last parliamentary elections was 2.3 million, but the rate of participation in the elections was only 59%.
The JBM study revealed that more than half of respondents did not vote in the last parliamentary elections, due to lack of qualified or trustworthy candidates.
A more likely scenario could be not knowing enough about what candidates actually stand for. Out of the total sample of JBM respondents, almost half (47%) see parliamentary discussions as irrelevant to their interests, 38% said that they are relevant “sometimes”, while the remaining 15% they are relevant (see Chart 3). A mere 26% of those who voted in the last elections actually observe parliamentary discussions, 37% of them do not, while the remaining 37% said they follow the debates “sometimes”. Out of the 26% who voted and said they do follow parliamentary discussions, 36% said parliament topics are relevant to their interests, 21% said they are not, and 43% said they are relevant “sometimes”.
Lower House Speaker’s assistant, Deputy Mohammad Arsalan (Liberal Democrat) attributed the growing loss of interest to two reasons: “First, it could be said that the performance of the current parliament is not up to the people’s aspirations. Second, the Lower House has been attacked unfairly in the media by people who have personal interests in marginalizing its role.” “
There is a need to amend the laws of elections, political parties, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to allow them to expand their work to include larger segments of the society and to protect the rights of citizens in dealing with these institutions… currently there are many restrictions enforced by law,” states Mr. Saqqaf. He pointed out that
raising awareness on democratic values, human rights, and development through educational curricula and allowing NGOs to cooperate in organizing campaigns is key to providing training on democracy to all citizens.Emad Hajjaj, social and political caricature artist, stated, “
Our parliament is not democratic. It makes a lot of noise, but it is easy to contain. The biggest proof of that is what we saw in their discussions with the government over the budget this year. They [deputies] made a lot of noise, but eventually, they approved the budget.”
Is parliament democratic?According to political analyst Dr. Fares Braizat “
the current electoral system infringes the principle of equality before the law enshrined in the constitution”, although according to his poll, 56% of Jordanians believe the law was fair in representing all sectors of the population.
“In the 2003 General Elections, Amman had 887.478 registered voters who had 23 seats in the Lower House of Parliament, while Al-Karak had 10 seats for 102.610 registered voters. This means a citizen’s vote in Al-Karak has three times the weight of its counterpart in the capital.
The implication of this distribution is that the engineering of the electoral system has favored the periphery over the center,” Dr. Braizat said.
Amman represents a little less than half of the total population yet holds only 23 out of the 110 Lower House seats.This extends to representation of women. Out of the 85 women surveyed by JBM, a relatively high 58% participated in the election. (One woman said that she did not vote because her husband wouldn’t allow it.) Women represent 49% of the population, according to the Department of Statistics, but have six seats in parliament. Yet 71% of citizens, when surveryed in 2004, believed that the electoral system under which the current parliamentary elections were held was fair to women.
Whether it is gender or geographic representation, there seems to be imbalances in the parliament that must be addressed. Mr. Arsalan suggested that the best way of representation can be achieved by applying a “one man, one vote, one constituency” formula, i.e. giving each citizen the right to vote for only one candidate, whereby only one candidate can win in each electoral district.
The current “one-man, one-vote” formula has been criticized by government opposition as undermining the principle of equality and reinforcing voting based on tribal and personal affiliations, rather than the candidate’s eligibility, and his/her economic, political, and ideological stand. “In light of the absence of serious programs by political parties, which should seek true rotation of authority, the majority of candidates win their parliament seats independently by gathering tribal votes,” Mr. Arsalan commented.
Voting the clan way According to JBM’s results, 53% of the respondents who voted in the last parliamentary elections voted on an ideological basis, 25% voted on a tribal/family basis, 12% on a religious basis, and 10% for other reasons (see Chart 4). Many of those who vote on a tribal basis paradoxically state that their reason for participating in the election is their duty and loyalty to Jordan. “Those parliamentarians [who win on a tribal basis] focus on servicing their personal relationships and therefore disregard their legislative, monitoring, and political role,” added Mr. Arsalan, noting that this weakens the House in fulfilling its duties in general.
According to the AHDR 2004, “Tribalism
in Arab countries provides a threat to freedoms, as tradition and tribalism, sometimes under the cover of religion, contribute to curtailing freedoms and fundamental rights and have weakened the good citizen’s strength and ability to advance.” The report also suggests that, “Tribal allegiances develop when the judiciary is ineffective or the executive authority is reluctant to implement its rulings, circumstances that make citizens unsure of their ability to realize their rights without the allegiances of the clan.”
Are political parties an alternative?“Though there are over 20 political parties in Jordan of different political persuasions, they lack a solid base of support and a viable platform, with the notable exception of the IAF,” King Abdullah was quoted as saying on his website.
Mr. Saqqaf of the NCHR said political parties and NGOs alike face financial obstacles that prevent them from fulfilling their roles. “The law enforces restrictions on NGOs and political parties finances, as it doesn’t allow space for much donations, which keeps the NGOs’ and political parties’ scope of work limited,” he said, adding that the government itself is not supporting these institutions financially, and if it did, it would force control over their scope of work.
Current political parties do not present a good alternative for the political, social, and economic aspirations of Jordanians. JBM found that people have little affinity to political parties. One of the respondents to the JBM questionnaire went as far as saying that political parties should “not exist” in order to enhance democracy in Jordan, another said that political parties are the main obstacle to democracy! Many, it seems, know little of what political parties represent, or how essential they are to democracy. 32% of JBM respondents did not know how to answer the question: “How could political parties contribute to political development in Jordan?” Those who did answer the question saw that the best way for political parties to take a more active role in political development is by merging. If they did not, some respondents said, nobody would be interested in joining them.
According to the IAF, the fear of government retribution is the reason people are losing interest in political parties, adding that political parties do still think about boycotting elections if freedoms were not guaranteed, but choose not to, because they do not want the situation to become any worse.
The AHDR 2004 suggests that, “There is an acute sectarian split in the political community between the Islamic parties on the one hand and the liberal and nationalist secular parties on the other (as well as other sectarian divisions along doctrinal, ethnic, tribal, and regional lines). As a result of this sectarian fragmentation, some parties and political forces have preferred to co-operate with undemocratic governments rather than work with their rivals to lay the groundwork for a democratic rule open to all.”Can the media do more?“
There are integral pillars to building a democracy: a free and elected parliament, an independent judiciary, contemporary legislation, a free and independent press, and an active civil society. We cannot speak about a democratic society without the existence of free press and free _expression, which are both inseparable and interrelated,” stated Nidal Mansour, founder of the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) and Editor-in-Chief of Al Hadath weekly newspaper.
Although press freedom varies from one Arab country to the other, the AHDR 2003 states that most Arab countries “place the media under the dominant political authorities and institutions, and employ media channels for political propaganda and entertainment, at the expense of other functions and services.”
In Jordan, the most-read Arabic daily newspaper and the only English daily have about a 55% government stake. The government also had shares in the country’s second most-read newspaper, until the establishment of a private newspaper that became Jordan’s number two paper. There are six daily newspapers in Jordan, which amounts to 0.001 newspapers per 1,000 citizens (almost one newspaper per 916,000 Jordanians). This is a remarkably low figure when contrasted with 285 papers per 1,000 people in developed nations, according to the AHDR 2003. The small number of Jordanian dailies is also indicative of the lack of diversity in their political views. Most daily newspapers generally tend to speak on behalf of, or in agreement with the government on most, if not all, issues.
The media hardly satisfies the role of a watchdog, let alone that of a fourth authority. “The media needs to go down to the street and mingle with the people and not the officials,” a 28-year-old telecom engineer said, summing up the general expectations of JBM’s respondents of local media. Some respondents complained of hearing news about Jordan, which are never mentioned in local press, from non-Jordanian media. “News of interest to the majority of the population and which relates to their daily concerns or which could enrich their scientific and cultural knowledge is scarce.
News about certain aspects of Arab politics, society, and religion is often simply not disclosed,” the AHDR 2003 maintains.
The NCHR said that both press organizations and journalists are also to blame when it comes to the ineffectiveness of spreading democracy.
“The space used in any newspaper focusing on supporting marginalized sectors of the society and pushing for more human rights and democracy is very little vis-à-vis the space used for public and private institutions’ public relations,” said Mr. Saqqaf.
In order to better achieve democracy, JBM respondents demanded that the media tell the whole story and the two sides of the story. One of them went as far as saying that we should learn from the Lebanese media. Known for pushing the envelope and being the voice of the people, Mr. Hajjaj commented, “
Jordanian media has to fight for its rights, which are obvious and guaranteed by international laws. The most basic of those is freedom of opinion and self _expression. The Press and Publication Law is rife with general expressions that keep journalists apprehensive.”
In 1993, Jordan’s Parliament enacted the Press and Publication Law. Instead of providing liberal protections to journalists, this law contained a number of restrictive provisions, including a limited definition of “journalist” and a list of 14 restrictions on the press. Also, out of the 211 temporary laws passed between 2001 and 2003, a controversial amendment to the penal code was made. “It [the amendment] stipulated harsh penalties for journalists and editors publishing news that undermines national unity, spreads hatred, harms the reputation of the state, officials, and citizens, and jeopardizes stability by spreading rumors or false information,” according to Oxford Business Group. These offences are often used as pretexts for censorship, and are vague and open to arbitrary interpretation.
However, in a welcomed development, King Abdullah recently met with the editors-in-chief of Jordanian dailies and said he directed the government to support the freedom of the press, guarantee reporters’ access to information, and enact a legislation to prohibit jailing journalists on charges related to their jobs.
Both the government and the media got the rating of “average” with regards to their role in political development. Scoring five more points in its performance average, the government came first and media second for their roles in political development. (See Charts A, B, C, D, E)
The main obstacles to Jordanian media, according to Mr. Mansour are: the absence of a clear political will to support freedom of press, the lack of a strategic vision for freedom of press, and the lack of independence and professionalism. “
If there was no clear commitment, then all talk of free press is a mere attempt at beautifying the image of Jordan. We want directives to be translated into practice,” stated Mr. Mansour, who was expelled from his position as secretary general of the Jordan Press Association for establishing the CDFJ.
“Until now, all we see are steps that show that we do not have a strategic vision; there is a constant change in legislations. We have scrapped the Ministry of Information and established six other institutions instead,” he added.
Commenting on why he seems to have more freedom of expression than others, Mr. Hajjaj said, “I
draw caricatures; I have a unique way of expressing myself. I argue for my level of freedom, before I argue for my salary. But it happened gradually. It is a grave mistake for us to allow others to set limits on the freedom of our expression and creativity. This is a war and we have to fight it.”
There is no doubt that the media has a crucial role to play in enhancing democracy, however other factors are at play.
Can Islam and democracy c-oexist? Islam is arguably one of the main victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Terrorists and Islamists became interchangeable words in the international media; they both were viewed as enemies of U.S. President George Bush’s drive of spreading democracy around the world, particularly in the Middle East.
“Our war is not against Islam, or against faith practiced by the Muslim people. Our war is a war against evil,” said Mr. Bush in one of many attempts to clarify the difference between Islam and terrorism. So is Islam compatible with democracy? 69% of JBM’s respondents, most of whom are Muslims, said yes, 12% said “to some extent”, 15% said no, while the remaining 4% said they didn’t know. (see Chart 5)
When asked whether they think religion and state should be separated in order to better achieve democracy, 77% said no, reasoning that Islam encompasses democracy and not the other way around. Out of the 69% who said that Islam and democracy are compatible, only 18% said religion and state should still be separated.
In the Sharia (Islamic Law), Shura is believed to be an equivalent to democracy, as it is a process of consultation, demanding that a ruler engages followers in decision-making. The word Shura also refers to an assembly that meets to solve the problems of a group of individuals, starting from a family and continuing to the political affairs of a country. Islamic historians argue that over history, the Muslim empire, which extended from India to Spain, was able to absorb people of a wide-spectrum of religious, ideological, and political orientations under the rule of Shura.
“The fundamental principles in Islam, which dictate good governance, include the realization of justice and equality, the assurance of public freedoms, the right of the nation to appoint and dismiss rulers, and guarantees of all public and private rights for non-Muslims and Muslims alike,” states the AHDR 2004.
Democracy and faith in the political process “I do not want to vote, because what the government wants is what is going to happen,” said a 23-year-old student. This student said that Jordan is “not democratic at all” and that the democratization process of Jordan has been “very bad”. Asked what the government could do to better achieve democracy he suggested, “Dismantling the parliament because it is useless. We need a parliament that is truly elected by the people and not the government, which, of course, is impossible.”
Although too extreme, this student echoes, to an extent, a general sentiment of political apathy in the Jordanian street. The lack of interest in politics could very well be a product of a lack of awareness. This is where political reform can play a critical role in educating people about the value of democracy and the importance of political participation.As it stands, a recent study conducted by Ipsos-Stat and Al-Ghad newspaper found that political reform was the last of priorities for Jordanians, with a mere 8% rating it as their number one priority. Economic reform topped their priorities with 63%, followed by social reform with 29%. Yet “economic corruption is the natural result of political corruption,” maintains the AHDR 2004.
The same study also found that the degree to which Jordanians are “convinced that the new government is capable of reform and positive change” drops when income and educational levels rise. “
The failure of consecutive governments in creating an atmosphere of freedom and political participation made Jordanians lose faith in the possibility of engaging in political life,” states Mr. Mansour.
Local political analysts recently referred to a “confidence crisis”, after a new CSS poll published on April 19 found that public trust in the ability of the government to shoulder its responsibilities and succeed in accomplishing the tasks at hand is declining. Jordanians have seen five governments (Rawabdeh, Abu Al Ragheb, Abu Al Ragheb, Fayez, and Badran) since King Abdullah’s accession to the throne on February 7, 1999. Each prime minister promised to take reform one level up, but none were able to shake up the mood on the street. “He is just like any other prime minister,” was a typical answer JBM respondents gave when asked whether they are optimistic about the new premier’s government.
People’s expectations of Dr. Badran’s government turned out below their expectations of the last six governments, the new poll found. In 1996, 82% of respondents said they believed Kabariti would be successful in shouldering his responsibility, while now, 62% believe that Dr. Badran would be successful. “People are gradually losing confidence in successive government because they cannot see that these governments are delivering, especially on major economic issue,” said Dr. Braizat.However, the poll indicated that 54% of respondents believe that the government could surge ahead with political development, and 57% believe it could strengthen free _expression. It is this kind of positive thinking that the government should capitalize on.
As it stands today, the street is alienated yet aching for change and that is why the government should act fast. Allowing greater freedom of _expression and press, the most basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by democracy, would not only seriously advance the democratization process in Jordan, but also enhance the government’s performance by bettering the monitoring process, and more importantly, actively engaging Jordanians in shaping their future.Talk of democratic reform is abound in the Middle East, and Jordan is no exception. The country is indeed viewed as the region’s pioneer in reform. And if that is to remain the case, Jordan should too walk the walk.
The Arab democracy debate intensifies in Washington
The Arab democracy debate intensifies in WashingtonBy Rami G. Khouri
Daily Star
Wednesday, May 04, 2005
One of the important and still evolving new developments in Washington's Middle East policy has been the recent proliferation in American efforts to study and to promote democratic reform throughout the Arab world. Several aspects of this seem significant, are very visible here in Washington, and need to be more widely appreciated throughout the Middle East. The extent, depth and quality of work being done in the United States on Arab democratization, along with economic, education, security and other reform issues, is impressive. It will also be consequential in due course, because this is an arena where Arabs and Americans are slowly finding it mutually beneficial to work together for a change, rather than opposing, resisting, resenting or fighting each other.
The bulk of the work on Arab democratic reforms is being done by civil society institutions, mostly think tanks and universities.
It is refreshing to have so much American energy devoted to exploring the best paths to Arab democracy, and to have American scholars, activists, institutions and officials finally joining and supporting those small numbers of Arabs who have been working for democratic reforms for decades.
One change already visible is that the initial American focus on simply advocating democratic change in the Middle East has now been replaced by a more subtle and useful analysis of three related issues:
how to bring about democratic change on the ground,
how to anticipate and accept the consequences of this (e.g., Islamists and groups critical of the U.S. and Israel are sure to gain power in many countries), and
how to align the democratization policy and trend with the other pressing issues in the region.
One consequence of this trend has been that public discussion of the Middle East in Washington and the U.S. as a whole has slightly shifted away from the traditional intense focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the more recent focus on Iraq and the "war on terror." There is also much debate and disagreement on the real motives for the American government's recent shift toward a greater focus on promoting Arab democracy, and whether Washington has either the commitment or seriousness needed to pursue this policy over the long term.
Critics or skeptics of the U.S. see its policy as driven only by its understandably angry reaction to the attack of September 11, 2001, with
Arab democracy being the antidote to dysfunctional political systems and environments that ultimately spawned a global terror industry. They point to the continued sharp discrepancies - or hypocritical inconsistencies - between Washington's democracy promotion efforts in different parts of the region. Iraq and Lebanon, for example, get a great deal of American attention, but promoting democracy seems infinitely less urgent for the U.S. in Libya and Tunisia, to mention only two of the most glaring examples of Arab autocracies and dictatorships that seem to elicit indifference from the American leadership.
These and other issues will sort themselves out over time, presumably, if this trend continues, because these matters are now being subjected to a great deal of very serious analysis and discussion.
One of the striking facets of this dynamic that should be grasped more widely in the Arab world is the critical, in fact the leading, role played by civil society institutions. The most serious policy-related research that both drives the debate and provides the American and Arab governments with useful options to consider is being conducted by organizations such as the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, the Center for International and Strategic Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Middle East Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a handful of others.Equally significant is that the research under way in most cases is managed jointly by American and Arab scholars, providing a combination of relevance, accuracy and realism that was largely missing from both the unilateral American government's exhortations and small-scale democracy programs of recent years and the pleas by Arab democrats for action on the ground.
The debate today is in the mainstream, whereas in the last decade or so the idea of changing Arab regimes and their political culture was more the private domain of slightly fringe groups that often seemed as interested in Israeli national security needs as they were in American or Arab needs - (Quite A Significant Change)
The debate has moved quickly in the last few years, from the arena of emotional exhortations and unilateral threats to the more productive level of exploring a range of more subtle, interlinked practical realities: realistic options for changing political environments in the Middle East, how the U.S., Europe and others abroad can be involved usefully and credibly, whether democratization and regime change via unilateral military force can both remain elements of American policy in the region, the best combination of positive inducements and sanctions or threats that could be used to prod change, and whether the focus for democratic reforms should be on Arab governments or civil society.
When I discussed these issues recently with J. Scott Carpenter, the deputy assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor,
it was clear that Washington itself was evolving in terms how it could most effectively work to promote Arab democracy. He thought a more collaborative and less confrontational era was in the making, noting that "we want to turn the page and see together how we can face the challenge of helping these societies and governments reform over time. We want this to be seen as more of a joint project than something of an American project."He also reflects what may be a slightly more humble American official posture that tries to respond to and work with Arab democratic activists, rather than lead or create them.
"
The focus on the Middle East is becoming multipolar, looking at Arab-Israel issues as well as the regimes themselves. The difference now over two years ago is a willingness to engage on real issues confronting societies in the region, and a real clear understanding by governments in the region of the need to change We also see people all over the region asking themselves, 'why not here?' Egyptians see events in Lebanon, Tunisians see Abu Mazen getting grilled by Palestinian journalists on Al-Jazeera television, and all this creates ferment in the region. The U.S. is not responsible for it, but we have a role to play, and we want to see how best to support and channel the ferment in a positive way."One of the reasons why the discussion and debate on Arab democratization are moving ahead so strongly in both the U.S. and the Middle East is that credible civil society activists and institutions are working together to drive the agenda. This has enriched the policy options available for all concerned governments, and has also provided an important new impetus that prods governments to behave more intelligently and urgently.Rami G. Khouri writes a weekly column for The Daily Star.
Political crisis in Jordan: Jordanian parliament, Prime Minister’s new government lock horns over economic team - meaning Bassem Awadallah
Political crisis in Jordan: Jordanian parliament, Prime Minister’s new government lock horns over economic team. MIDDLE EAST ONLINE
AMMAN - The government of Jordan's new Prime Minister Adnan Badran is locked in a dispute with parliament, which has come out in open revolt against members of his cabinet and threatened a no confidence vote.
"
Most MPs in the loyalist camp have clearly stated they will not vote for a confidence motion in the Badran government so long as it includes the ministerial economic team which is considered suspect," deputy speaker Mamduh Abbadi said.
The team is led by Finance Minister Bassem Awadallah, who was ousted from the previous cabinet but made a comeback less than two months later in the Badran government formed last month.
"
The deputies think these ministers are foreign to Jordan, have no credibility and do not understand Jordan's people or society, or the situation of the poor in this country," Abbadi said.
At a rowdy meeting between deputies and the prime minister on Tuesday, MPs urged Badran to drop Awadallah and his supporters from the government or risk losing a confidence vote.A petition has been presented to the premier to demand the lineup be modified,
leading a political analyst in Amman to comment that the crisis has "transformed the loyalists into the opposition for the first time in Jordan".Badran, a respected 69-year-old academic, on April 7 formed a 25-minister cabinet and kept in his line-up 12 members of the former administration of Faisal al-Fayez. His appointment was seen as a sign that a democratic reform process would be speeded up.
But
a former minister, the Islamist independent MP Abdullah Akayleh, said the new economic team were "a clique of 'new liberals' with a foreign agenda who do not know Jordan, its priorities and its concerns".
They "take their orders from abroad" and many of them "represent foreign companies", he charged - (In my humble opinion, this is a big pile of rubbish. Dr. Basem in specific, is cleaner than anyone of these insignificant so called representatives of the people. He has done more to the country than all of them put together.)
