A Future Jordan - نحن الأردن: February 2005

Sunday, February 27, 2005

A Very Useful Website on Jordan's Treasure, the Rose City of Petra, at www.go2petra.com

Fahed Al Fanek on the National Agenda

I don't agree with most of what Fahed AL Fanek's writes in the Jordanian Press but there is some truth to what he included in his article about the National Agenda...

Jordan's agenda for ten years
Fahed Fanek
THE JORDAN TIMES
Monday, February 21, 2005

Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher hinted recently that Jordan will soon work on formulating a nationally agreed agenda to be implemented during the coming ten years. It may be called a vision or a list of priorities, but not a detailed or rigid plan.

His Majesty King Abdullah decided to form a Royal Committee to formulate the agenda.

The idea of the agenda is obviously good. Why should anyone object to a planned perception of the road ahead and the attempt to bring future developments under control, to fit a desirable pattern, and guide changes and developments in the direction of pre-determined national objectives, in line with the vision of the King for Jordan in 2115.

Since the agenda will be trans-government, it was not logical to ask the present government to do it alone and build such long-term vision that can be acceptable to future governments. The mandate given to the present government does not extend for ten years. Based on past experience, at least three or four more governments will come to power during the coming decade. Therefore, it was only normal for the King to call on various political, economic and social organisations and individual activists to take part in this endeavor.

However, the participation of selected political and civil societies and individuals, of all walks of life, may not make the job easy. Naturally, there are conflicting opinions, interests and priorities in a pluralistic society like ours, which will make a consensus difficult to achieve. What may be agreed among all could not be more than the bare minimum, which does not rise to the high ambitions of His Majesty, the only legitimate source for long-term vision.

Jordan's priorities for the coming ten years do not only differ widely from one social segment to another, they can also be altered following the changing circumstances in the region. Unlike Egypt, which can project a vision for the year 2020, Jordan needs a flexible and dynamic plan that can adapt itself to surrounding upheavals taking place from time to time.

What about a three-year moving plan that ends in 2007? Once 2005 is over, the plan will be revised to fit the three years ending in 2008, and so forth. This means that we shall always have a forward vision three years ahead, subject to amendments if needed every year. To exceed this medium-term period is to speculate and make haphazard assumptions regarding the regional and international circumstances that do not lend themselves to prediction or control.

From a practical point of view, the agenda should come up with objectives and means to face a large number of issues. These are some possible items that come to mind, not arranged according to their relative importance: economic growth rate, the central government budget, poverty, unemployment, corruption, upgrading human resources, political reform, a smaller but more efficient government, education, health, information technology, security, competitiveness, water, agriculture, industry, tourism, democracy, the right of return, political parties, professional associations, relative representation, women, quotas, judiciary system, overall excellence, etc.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that our past experiments with planning are not promising. Since the 1960s, we've been drawing plans for five or three years each, but did not abide by them. Instead of achieving the set goals, in many cases the opposite took place and, of course, officials did not lack excuses.

We did not score successes in planning in as much as we did in crisis management, when a sudden and unanticipated state of affairs would come about and render our plans obsolete. Jordanian circumstances require short-term and flexible planning, coupled with highly qualified decision makers to lead the country to safety and transform regional risks into opportunities and advantages.

Hajjaj on Dr. Bassem Awadallah's Resignation.... True or Not...

Saturday, February 19, 2005

What a great loss to the reform in Jordan... and to all reformers

“Jordan minister resigns amid criticism over handling of aid”
AFP (February 19): Jordanian Planning Minister Bassem Awadallah, who also holds the international cooperation portfolio, resigned Saturday, amid criticism in parliament over his handling of aid projects, officials said. “Planning Minister Bassem Awadallah has resigned, and a royal decree accepting the resignation will be issued Saturday afternoon,” one official told AFP. Another senior official confirmed that the minister was to step down. Awadallah, 40, was chairman of the government’s economic policy committee and considered close to King Abdullah II. He was also responsible for managing aid projects in the country, and has been criticised for ignoring the needs of rural areas. Abdullah recently directed a royal commission to consider dividing the country into three development zones, whose administrations would be automous and whose boards would be locally elected, to manage projects in their areas. That was seen as a first sign of royal disapproval of the minister. Awadallah has held the planning job since 2001. Individual ministerial resignations are a rarity in Jordan.

“Jordanian planning minister resigns, no reason given”
AP: A top Cabinet minister has resigned and a successor is expected to be named soon, government spokeswoman Asma Khader said Saturday. Planning Minister Bassem Awadallah has tendered his resignation to the prime minister, Khader said. She said she did not know why Awadallah, who is also a minister for international cooperation, has quit. “He just wanted to leave,” Khader said. She said a successor is likely to be named soon, “possibly tomorrow.” No other details were immediately available. Awadallah is a close confidant of Jordan’s King Abdullah II and served as an economic strategist under the monarch for at least three years until he took his Cabinet portfolio in 2003. A U.S. university graduate, Awadallah is considered one of the top planning strategists in Jordan, a cash-strapped nation saddled by recession and foreign debts.

Sunday, February 06, 2005

Jordan: Past, Present (Unfortunately), and Future (Inshallah Not)

Deputy PM, Muasher interview with the Lebanese Daily Star on Reform in Jordan

Jordan initiates massive reform of public sector
Rami G. Khouri
The Daily Star
January 7, 2005

AMMAN: One of the most ambitious public sector reform projects in the Arab world moves into high gear this month when the Jordanian government launches a series of committees representing all sectors of society, with the specific aim of drawing up a “national agenda” of reform priorities for the next ten years. In an interview with The Daily Star the deputy prime minister and minister of government performance, Marwan Muasher, who has the task of managing the overall reform process, said: “The public sector reform plan does not have a chance of success unless the Jordanian people see this as an inclusive process. Society as a whole must set priorities in a transparent and participatory manner, in order for the long-term reform process to withstand changes in governments in the future.” Public skepticism is high, because most governments in Jordan in the past several decades have not followed through on their declared aim of improving the efficiency of state institutions and public services.

The government responds that the reform agenda will require many years to bear fruit, and that it must show results quickly. “We realize that most Jordanians don’t think we’ll succeed, which is why we must show results quickly, within a year or two, in order to gain the trust of citizens who have to buy into the process.

“We want to start a process of change that will allow the ordinary citizen to feel that he or she is treated fairly by the state. This requires introducing concepts and systems of accountability, transparency and measurable performance indicators, all of which need time to take effect” Muasher said. The public sector reform process includes four main components, some of which are already underway. The first will “refocus how the government works at the strategic and operational levels,” Muasher explained. At the strategic level, the national committees, comprising parliamentarians, civil society activists, professional societies and unions, the private sector and others in society, will redefine government priorities for the coming 10 years in all sectors.

This will include establishing measurable “performance indicators” at the macro level that would provide a means of regular accountability. At the operational level, “service delivery standards” for every ministry and department will be established and explained. A booklet to be given to every citizen will allow citizens and government employees alike to know what to expect and to do in their routine bureaucratic encounters. Regular “citizen voice” polls will track the public’s feelings about the services it gets from government offices, and the poll results will be published. The second leg of the reform plan will overhaul how the government manages its human and financial resources, Muasher explained. The state budget will be reformed to reflect the priorities established by the national committees, and public sector hiring and promotion will gradually change to achieve merit-based criteria, rather than personal connections and wasta (influence).

The third component will restructure how business is done at the prime ministry, the center of power of the public sector. Muasher noted that of some 3,000 decrees issued by the prime ministry last year, only 1.3 percent related to public policy issues and the other 98.7 percent were routine matters that should be handled at ministry or department level. Decentralization measures to be launched soon aim to achieve this. A professional secretariat will also manage existing ministerial subcommittees that will assess issues and offer recommendations for the Cabinet’s final decision.

Two public sector reform ministries were established in this government last year: Muasher’s Ministry of Government Performance for strategic level and national agenda matters, and the Ministry for Public Sector Reform (headed by Dr. Ahmad Massadeh) that works at the operational level, including building capacity within ministries.

The fourth reform component is to streamline government structures into a simpler, more efficient system, reducing the existing 25 ministries and 36 independent public institutions. The government has no illusions about achieving these goals easily or quickly. “We spent a year formulating this reform strategy. We’re not reinventing the wheel here,” Muasher explained. He pointed to a pilot project that he oversaw when he was foreign minister in recent years. The ministry’s personnel law was changed to make hiring and promoting staff subject less to seniority and personal connections, and more to merit, exams, training and objective performance assessments. After 18 months, he said, the ministry stopped getting the traditional personal telephone calls from influential people who wanted to get a friend or cousin hired. He and the government now want to take this experience to the national level, recognizing that Jordan and the Arab world as a whole simply have no option if they want to avoid facing a bleak future.

Some 1.3 million young people aged 10-19 will enter the workforce in the coming years. If things do not change and Jordan’s public sector continues to generate some 25,000 new jobs a year, the national unemployment rate would increase from 15 to 24 percent in ten years, Muasher said. If the state creates 50,000 jobs a year, unemployment would remain stable at its current high level. The country must create 75,000 new jobs per year to see unemployment drop to 10 percent. The only way that can happen is to radically restructure the economy, improve efficiency and productivity, and reduce public sector dominance of society and economy. Muasher rejects the common accusation that Jordan is making administrative and economic reforms without parallel political changes. “Reform can only succeed if it is integrated across all sectors, including political and economic life, education, and the media. We cannot reform in compartments and be credible or successful.”

Satloff on the Recente Decentralization Initiative in Jordan

POLICYWATCH #953
February 4, 2005
ANALYSIS OF NEAR EAST POLICY FROM THE SCHOLARS AND ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

A REFORM INITIATIVE IN JORDAN:
TRYING TO KEEP PACE WITH IRAQI AND PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS
By Robert Satloff

To view this PolicyWatch on our new website go to:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2249

Jordan's King Abdullah recently announced a major initiative for decentralizing political and fiscal authority in the kingdom by establishing a number of regional assemblies and empowering them with many of the responsibilities currently enjoyed by the parliament and central government. This effort should be viewed as one of the means by which the Hashemite monarch hopes to keep pace with the democratizing trend in the Middle East, headlined by the success of recent elections on Jordan's east (Iraq) and west (West Bank/Gaza).

Background
For many years, Jordan has deservedly enjoyed a reputation as a standard-bearer of moderation and reform among Arab states. Education is highly prized, illiteracy rates are low, and political prisoners are few and rarely incarcerated for long. The late King Hussein reconstituted the parliament in the mid-1980s; despite an electoral system weighted in favor of "East Bankers" over "Jordanians of Palestinian origin"(as the local euphemism goes), Jordan has held relatively free elections ever since. Women have long held the right to vote and have exercised it in large numbers. In a region where reformers, democrats, and social mavericks routinely suffer imprisonment, torture, disappearance, or death, the long arm of the Jordanian state is normally limited to a stern warning, a lost job, or a confiscated passport.

In recent years, the kingdom has focused most of its national efforts on economic reform, including efforts to streamline business start-ups, encourage foreign investment, and reduce bureaucracy. The Qualifying Industrial Zones established in cooperation with Israel have been showcase initiatives, producing thousands of jobs and nearly $1 billion worth of exports to the United States. The combined effect of these policies -- complemented by a sizable infusion of cash from Iraqi expatriates, Syrian land speculators, Palestinians seeking a violence-free sanctuary for their capital, U.S. economic aid, and the derivative benefits of U.S. companies setting up shop in Jordan to service operations in Iraq -- provided Jordan with an impressive 7 percent growth rate in 2004.

The push for economic reform that has characterized Abdullah's six years on the throne has not been matched, however, by a similar push toward expanded liberalization and democratization. This inertia is exemplified by the extended period during which the king has governed by issuing dozens of royal decrees rather than through the parliamentary mechanisms of a constitutional monarchy. The regime explains this arrangement as a reaction to the barrenness of parliamentary life, in which ideological parties are weak, personality cliques are powerful, and a blocking coalition of Islamists and tribal conservatives regularly found common ground in opposing some of the government's more progressive reforms (e.g., against "honor killings"). All the while, Jordan's media environment has atrophied. Though Jordan once touted itself as a possible home for "free media" in the region, the kingdom's media is less robust, free-wheeling, and provocative than can be found in other modernizing monarchies such as Morocco.

A Move to Decentralize
In this context, the king delivered a brief nationwide address on January 26 announcing what was touted as major political and administrative reform. Specifically, he outlined a new approach to political participation in public life: "As political development is the gateway to the full participation of all segments of grassroots and civil society institutions in the various aspects of the development process, I assert here that political development should start at the grassroots level, then move up to decisionmaking centers, and not vice versa." Operationally, he said, the kingdom's current administrative divisions will be "reconsidered." The existing governorates -- twelve in number, from Irbid in the north to Aqaba in the south -- will be combined into a small number (three or four) of "development areas or regions." Each region will have a directly elected local assembly that, along with directly elected municipal councils, will "set priorities and draw up plans and programs related to their respective regions." He specifically noted that these new assemblies would enjoy the power of the purse, that is, making decisions over "public facilities, investment priorities, expenditures on capital and services projects, and in overseeing the performance of official bodies in all areas." In explaining the rationale for this whole exercise, he noted that "these tasks should no longer be exclusive to central decisionmakers because the people of each region are more aware of their interests and needs."

In practical terms, the king's plan is effectively a strategy to circumvent two sets of institutions: parliament and the central government ministries. Depending on how it is implemented, the king's proposal to transfer primary responsibility for many areas of planning, spending, and service delivery -- possibly even in such politically explosive fields as education, health, and public works -- from Amman to the regions could translate into a huge shift of influence over jobs and money from politicians and bureaucrats in the capital to local officials in the provinces.

Prospects for Change
Whether Jordan persists with a plan for grassroots empowerment remains to be seen. Here, the kingdom must navigate between two unpalatable outcomes. On the one hand, having promised real change, the regime's credibility is now at stake. This means rejecting a mere reshuffling of the deck chairs on the ship of state, a form-over-function change that would occupy the gossiping energies of the political class but leave little real reform in its wake. Jordan is a small country with an entrenched political elite; real political change cannot occur without stepping on some powerful toes. At the same time, the palace is unlikely to press forward with a scheme that could turn its most loyal supporters into aggrieved critics. Pursuing genuine decentralization that empowers local government will therefore be a challenge.

On the other hand, the regime must avoid unleashing so much decentralization that it disturbs the carefully nurtured process of national integration that has registered so much success in recent years, a process symbolized by Abdullah's "Jordan First" campaign. While Jordan has an overwhelmingly Sunni Arab population, differences in politics, culture, tribalism, and national origin can still run deep. The large Palestinian populations in some areas will be a major concern, but there are other important factors to watch, such as the unusually deep support for radical Islamists in Transjordanian strongholds like Salt and Maan.

Because the palace is the source of political support for the reform initiative, decentralization actually has the potential to improve the lot of ordinary citizens, which itself would be a major achievement. The key determinants of success will be the details of legal and administrative implementation, including precise answers to such questions as who will control taxation, whether Amman or the provinces will determine spending priorities, and whether poorer regions will be able to count on extra aid from the central government to ensure adequate service delivery. Circumventing parliament will not by itself produce much for ordinary Jordanians and will be characterized by some as, at most, a lateral step for reform; redefining the relationship between the center and the provinces is the key.

So far, the king has moved ahead as promised with naming a blue-ribbon Royal Commission to define the specifics of implementing the decentralization plan. The twelve-member group includes three former prime ministers, and Deputy Prime Minister (and former foreign minister) Marwan Muasher has reportedly been tapped for the thankless task of coordinating the commission's work with what must be a wary government.

Regional Context
The real meaning of the king's initiative can perhaps be found in its regional context. His nationwide address came less than three weeks after Palestinian presidential elections and just four days before Iraqi parliamentary elections. The speech itself praised the former and encouraged participation in the latter. In fact, these were the only other topics the king discussed, underscoring the ineluctable connection between political reform in Jordan and political reform in the local neighborhood. Whatever the outcome of the decentralization plan, Jordan seems intent on taking steps to keep pace with the widening of popular participation in the surrounding region. Democracy may not be surging, but its ripple effects are unmistakable.

Robert Satloff is executive director of The Washington Institute.

Abu Mahjoub Today on Reform

Al Ghad in the New York Times

“Spreading the Word: Who’s Who in the Arab Media”
Hassan M. Fattah
New York Times
February 6, 2005

If you want to reach Arabs, here are some of the outlets you have to reach.

NEWSPAPERS
Like most of the world, Arabs watch television more than they read newspapers. Most papers tend to be local, with small circulations and limited advertising. Unlike satellite channels, these papers can be blocked at a government’s will, and often are. (To minimize problems, several pan-Arab newspapers publish out of Europe.) Still, their articles can be heavily influential.

Al Ghad: This new, independent newspaper is making waves in Jordan, taking on the established government-owned papers. Al Ghad is trying to cater to Jordan’s young elite by writing about controversial issues - like education and democratic reform - of interest to Arab baby boomers. The paper strives for a balanced editorial page. For instance, it has published letters from the Israeli ambassador to Jordan, something other Arab newspapers are very rarely willing to do.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

The way work is done in a Jordanian Government Departement

CBS on lack of Progress on Reform in Jordan

"Mideast 'Friends' Give U.S. Pains" (Opinion)
February 2, 2005

CBS: Naturally enough, Jordanians are less than thrilled by this situation, so now and again they venture into the town square to complain. And then they get arrested. The government of the United States, newly recommitted to freedom, had nothing whatsoever to say about this until an intrepid White House reporter asked the president about it on January 26. Bush punted, pleading ignorance of the facts and noting that "His Majesty is making progress" toward democracy. In fact, His Majesty is doing no such thing. Recent years have seen cosmetic proposals put forward while, in practice, Jordan moves backward -- gerrymandering an unrepresentative but compliant parliament; cracking down on the press, professional associations, and other civil-society groups; restricting public assembly; and relying on ad hoc decrees promulgated while the parliament is out of session. There's no indication that Bush decided to familiarize himself with the facts of the case -- or even with the general political situation in Jordan -- as neither he nor any of his subordinates has mentioned it since. Nor has he been asked about it again.

President Bush Remarks on Jordan

Excerpt from President Bush’s news conference yesterday
January 26, 2005

Q. Last month in Jordan, a gentleman named Ali Hattar was arrested after delivering a lecture called “Why We Boycott America.” He was charged under Section 191 of their penal code for slander of government officials. He stood up for democracy, you might say. And I wonder if here and now you will specifically condemn this abuse of human rights by a key American ally. And if you won’t, sir, then what, in a practical sense, do your fine words mean?

President Bush: I am unaware of the case. You’ve asked me to comment on something that I didn’t know took place. I urge my friend, His Majesty, to make sure that democracy continues to advance in Jordan. . . . As I said in my speech, not every nation is going to immediately adopt America’s vision of democracy and I fully understand that. But we expect nations to adopt the values inherent in a democracy, which is human rights and human dignity, that every person matters and every person ought to have a voice. And His Majesty is making progress toward that goal. I can’t speak specifically to the case. You’re asking me to speak about a case and I don’t know the facts. . . .

I wanted to start my posts with this very significant Cartoon by Jordan's renowned Cartoonest, Imad Hajjaj. I have called this cartoon, the True Public Sector Reform

Tuesday, February 01, 2005

Welcome Note....

I would like to welcome you all to my newly created blog. I will attempt to share with you all my views on the current developments in Jordan, whether undertaken by the government, the private sector or Civil Society. I will also post excerpts and full text of articles and opinion pieces on issues related to Jordan, mostly reform in addition to links to interesting website or news items in International Press.

I hope that you will continously check my blog for new postings and I will make sure to notify you all when I post something new.

Regards,

Ashraf M. Zeitoon

A Future Jordan - نحن الأردن