Stop calling for reform BY FAHED AL FANEK..... Mr. Fanek, Wake Up and Smell the Coffee
Stop calling for reform
Fahed Fanek
Monday, December 19, 2005
THE JORDAN TIMES
My Comments are in
BlueIt is meaningless and counterproductive to continue working overtime to advocate reform in this country. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of anybody who is against reform as such - Yes, there are so many people who are against reform, any kind of reform. These are people with vested interests that will be undermined by any change or reform whether political or economical. The problem in this respect is that we don't agree on the sort of reform we are after. A good example is the call for a modern law on elections, which can mean different things to different people.
Many observers are suspicious, for good reason, that possible hidden agendas are advanced under the guise of reform while the real purpose is to undermine the very bases of our state as we know it - For God's sake, come one and be realistic
So far, most, if not all, the reactions drawn by the output of the National Agenda were on the negative side. Only one person, its chairman, was trying hard to promote its findings and recommendations.
It is obvious that there is no consensus developing over the agenda. No majority is taking its side. Even the members of the Royal Committee, which drafted the agenda, are keeping their distance and maintaining silence, not to mention the major differences among the members who could not reconcile and only agreed on the bare minimum requirement that does not satisfy many real reformers -
I am sure that he is not one of those people...
The Royal Committee came up with a set of controversial recommendations which overshadowed
the good and agreed reforms -
This must be a first, Mr. pessimism especially when it comes to the National Agenda, states for the first time ever that the the National Agenda came up with good reforms. Part of the recommendations were outright harmful, such as the dismantling of the Press Association, slashing the cost of government staff as a rate of the gross domestic product in half, claiming that Jordan can, in a few years, do without foreign grants and undertaking to reverse the deficit in the budget after grants into a surplus before grants. Such
false and unattainable objectives may urge donor countries not to continue supporting Jordan financially if, as the committee claims, it can stand on its own without foreign aid or any kind of budget support -
Mr. Economy is of the view that we should continue to beg for money from everyone instead of getting our act together....So far, there is a lot of talk about the need to reform,
but no actual reform is taking place -
This is the only stance where I agree with what Mr. Economy !!!, as if the call for reform were meant only for international consumption. This gives a bad impression. The result is the belief that many things in the country are wrong and must be corrected, but no correction is happening.
Talking about reform becomes a substitute for reform. Observers abroad were given the impression that things in Jordan are so bad that they need immediate reform, but reform is not going to happen due to lack of political will - this is also right....
Such impression made a prominent professor of politics at an American university criticise Jordan for failure to reform.
He described the reform programme in the country as fake, mere talk, and said that the Jordanian press drew its knives to kill the National Agenda which, he thought, is the long-awaited instrument for reform.He is talking here about Marc Lynch, who is an Associate Professor at the Political Science Department at Williams College. Lynch wrote a piece for the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington on the National Agenda, which can be viewed through the link belowhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17679&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme#kniveshttp://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/jordan/index.htmlWe should not allow the image of the country to be unnecessarily tarnished. We owe it to ourselves to shed light on the reforms that took place and the outstanding results achieved over the past several years. There must be a good reason why Jordan is ahead of other countries in the same class of economic development, as shown by international indices - Mr. Economy is dillusional. We have been regressing on so many fronts, primerally political and other countries are regions are ahead of us in so many ways. he should have read the latest Economist Intelligence Unit report on the dynamics of democracy in the region...
I shall dwell a little bit on the economic side.
As far as economic reform is concerned, we have a clean bill of health issued by the International Monetary Fund. IMF experts certified that Jordan completed successfully the reform programme, has graduated from the adjustment and stabilisation programme, and is no more in need of IMF guidance. As far as privatisation is concerned, almost 80 per cent of the programme has already been implemented successfully. Due to security, stability and economic reform, the economy was able to attract direct foreign investments and register a record growth rate of 7.5 per cent this year. Foreign trade is up 25 per cent, another indication of a free market economy.
Jordan scored better than Egypt and Morocco in the human development index produced by the United Nations Development Programme, in the government effectiveness, as measured by the World Bank index, in transparency, as measured by the index of Transparency International, and in competitiveness, as measured by the index of World Economic Forum.
We are reforming effectively, achieving, in the process, tangible and measurable results. Reform in Jordan is not a matter of talking.
Those who talk about reform do not mean it. They are actually tarnishing the image of the country and giving the wrong impression that we need radical reforms but fail to do them - Those who talk about the need for reform are true Jordanian patriots, who have the wellbeing of teh country and it's citizens in their hearts. The country has never faced such challanges, locally, regionally and internationally and reforming our country is the only way to strengthen and solidify our identity to face the numerous challanges ahead.People who talk about reform are reformers at heart and aren't, in any way possible, aiming to tarnish the image of the country. The Image of the country is tarnished by people like Mr. Economy, whose sole purpose is to send a message that we are living in UTOPIA and nothing needs to be changed....Mr. Fanek, Wake up and smell the coffee ....
A Very alarming article by Dore Gold - Growing al-Qaida threat to Jordan worries Israel
You can check this very alarming article from UPI on Growing al-Qaida threat to Jordan worries Israel, on my other blog
http://jordanandpeaceprocess.blogspot.com/The Article goes on to say that
"But now there is a danger of this activity becoming more widespread," Gold stresses. "Jordanian security officials have estimated that recently 500 Jordanians have been arrested for links with al-Qaida. Indeed, according to a report in the London Sunday Times, Jordanian security sources believed that the Iraqi suicide bombers who attacked in Amman received help from Jordanian soldiers. If the report is true, it means that Zarqawi's network had penetrated the Jordanian defense establishment in a manner reminiscent of al-Qaida's recruitment of members of the Saudi National Guard."
Plan delineates regions, sets representation - By Francesa Swalha on the Decentralisation plan for Jordna
Plan delineates regions, sets representation
By Francesca Sawalha
04/12/2005
The Jordan Times
AMMAN —
A Royal committee is proposing to divide the Kingdom into three development regions, each with an elected council, to jump-start decentralisation, enhance public participation in decision-making and ensure more efficiency in local government. The proposal, submitted to His Majesty King Abdullah 10 days ago,
also conceives of a return to fully elected municipal councils, reversing a 2003 decision granting the Council of Ministers the right to appoint the mayor and half the members of each council.Each named region is to include four existing governorates: The northern Yarmouk region will include the governorates of Irbid, Ajloun, Mafraq and Jerash, and have the city of Irbid as its capital; the central Raghadan region will include the Amman, Balqa, Zarqa and Madaba governorates — but exclude the Greater Amman Municipality — and have its capital in Salt; the southern Muta region will comprise the governorates of Karak, Maan, Tafileh and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), with Karak as capital. This last region is also slated to comprise a "Petra region" with a special statute, modelled on the ASEZ.
The proposal suggests to exclude the Greater Amman Municipality and its two million inhabitants from the long awaited reform because "being the capital city, Amman is shared by all Jordanians," Royal committee member Maha Khatib told The Jordan Times. "Plus, Amman is [home to] the central government and it is quite well developed in terms of services and infrastructure. We need to drive development efforts towards the other regions," Khatib explained.
In a televised address to the nation in January, King Abdullah announced
an administrative reform for the creation of "development areas, or regions," each with a "directly elected council to work hand-in-hand with elected municipal councils to set development priorities and draw up plans and programmes." The King emphasised that
the ultimate goal of the reform was to reverse the top-to-bottom approach typical of liberalisation efforts so far: "Political development should start at the grassroots level, then move up to decision-making centres, and not vice-versa."He also listed the functions of the proposed regional councils: "Affairs related to public facilities, investment priorities, capital expenditures and services, and oversee the performance of official bodies in all areas."The committee appointed by the King a few days after his address included three former PMs (Fayez Tarawneh, Abdur-Ra'uf S. Rawabdeh and Zeid Rifai), seven former ministers (Aqel Biltaji, Marwan Hmoud, Awad Khleifat, Rajai Dajani, Nayef Qadi, Hisham Tal and Abdul Hadi Majali), MP Mamdouh Abbadi and Khatib, who is director general of the Jordan River Foundation.
The proposal, presented to the King on November 23, definitely dispels rumours of a fourth, central region supposedly intended to pave the way for a Jordanian role in the West Bank — rumours already denied by top officials over the past several months.
The Royal committee appears to have put particular emphasis on the issue of representation and participation, detailing formulae for the elections of both municipal and regional councils. Municipal councils would be elected under the one-person, one-vote system. Each municipality will elect a minimum of seven and a maximum of 30 council members, ideally with one representative per 10,000 inhabitants. In addition to elected mayors, who will play a purely political role, the proposal foresees each municipal council having an appointed CEO to manage day-to-day business. "
One cannot expect an appointed mayor to have the necessary expertise in terms of management, finance, or engineering to run day-to-day business," Khatib explained.
As for regional councils, they are expected to comprise 10 elected representatives for each governorate. Each governorate will comprise 10 voting districts, each electing one representative under the one-person, one-vote system. Each regional council is envisaged to elect its head, deputy head and two assistants. An appointed commissioner, with ministerial rank, would liaise between the regional councils and central government.The Royal committee suggests that
regional councils be in charge of "defining the developmental identity of each region," reviewing and approving socio-economic plans and supervising regional projects. National development projects would remain in the portfolio of the central government, but regional councils would be asked to step in to coordinate some of the efforts and ensure implementation of certain components.
Budgetary and taxation issues have been cited by experts over the past months as critical factors in the success of the regional administrative reform. Analysts have been arguing whether the proposed regions should be given substantial taxation responsibilities, and be allowed to use tax revenues for capital and development expenditures. Though seemingly fair, such a system would condemn poor regions to remain poor, or become even poorer, in a country where 60 per cent of the GDP is generated in the Greater Amman area. According to Khatib,
the Royal committee solved the problem by referring to existing legislation, under which only the central government can exercise taxation functions. Each region would therefore be assigned a budget from the central state budget, subjected as all other parts of the state budget to Parliament's endorsement.
On the Edge - Threats to Jordanian Reform FROM HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
On the Edge - Threats to Jordanian ReformFrom the ‘Energy - Fuel for Thought’
Volume 26, Issue 4
Winter 2005
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
Matthew Sullivan is a staff writer at the Harvard International Review.On many levels, Jordan continues to stand among Arab-Muslim countries as the best hope for facilitating peace and genuine democratic reform in the Middle East. Ten years ago, Jordan’s King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a landmark peace treaty second only to Israel’s 1979 accord with Egypt. King Abdullah, Hussein’s successor, has overseen five years of moderate political and economic reforms and
has distinguished himself among Arab leaders as the most consistent, liberal advocate of reform.Today, committed reformers, Muslim Brotherhood members, and several women all hold seats in Jordan’s parliament. Yet in light of the stalled US-led “Road Map” and ongoing violence under the occupation of Iraq,
hope for accelerated democratization in Jordan is waning. Indeed, external events and domestic pressures are encumbering Jordan’s ability to serve as the region’s leading voice for peace and model for reform.The Jordanian monarchy’s difficult relations with the majority Palestinian population have been exacerbated by developments since 2000. The construction of a security fence in the West Bank and the Israeli plan for unilateral withdrawal from Gaza have produced discontent. Critics have decried Abdullah’s calls for the Palestinian Authority to complete institutional restructuring and to articulate more specific demands of Israel that could serve as a point of departure for renewed negotiations. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade issued a statement condemning Abdullah for betrayal of the Palestinian cause and many Jordanian Palestinians share this sentiment.
While King Abdullah’s marriage to a Palestinian woman with familial ties to the West Bank and his appointment of Palestinians to ministerial positions reflect a desire for inclusion, tensions are likely to remain high so long as the Israeli-Palestinian situation does not improve.
Second, Jordan’s tactical support for the war in Iraq and assistance since the fall of Baghdad have raised the possibility of a violent response from Islamic militants. In a reversal of King Hussein’s support of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, Abdullah permitted territorial access to US Special Forces in 2003 and has helped with the training of Iraqi police and soldiers. The shift sparked a new cycle of outspoken criticism and Jordan, like other coalition members, has been the target of Islamic terrorism. Last spring, Jordanian police claimed to have disrupted a plot to employ chemical weapons against governmental and US targets in Amman. The details of the effort appear consistent with Al Qaeda operations, which use armored trucks and large quantities of explosives, and Jordanian authorities believe that Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, a militia leader in neighboring Iraq, was behind the plan.
Deviation from reform efforts reflects a need perceived by Jordanian officials to counteract such opposition and enhance security. Jordan’s most recent major governmental shakeup came in October 2003. At that time,
the number of cabinet ministers was cut by a quarter, a new appointment system for municipal councils was enacted, and Feisal al-Fayez, a former royal court official with a reputation for compliance, was selected as prime minister. While the restructuring was billed as a means to infuse talent and limit tribal influence from government, many believed its primary motivation was a greater empowerment of Abdullah. The arrest of more than three dozen Islamic leaders on September 9, 2004, signaled that the Interior Ministry’s surveillance efforts would extend inside mosque walls, and one cleric spent three days in prison after refusing to sign a statement promising to temper his criticisms. It is unclear, however, whether any of the arrested leaders had ties to violent opposition groups.
The near future will hold further challenges for Abdullah and Jordanian reformers. Iraq, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza remain vulnerable to escalating conflict, and several government officials have expressed fears that Israeli policy in the West Bank will produce an influx of Palestinians into Jordan. The United States has been forced to distance itself from reform efforts so as to avoid contaminating the cause with a US label.
Indeed, the greatest challenge for Abdullah and other Jordanian leaders is to defeat its increasingly violent opponents while creating a reform process and peace initiatives with an Arab face. Speaking last May as host of the World Economic Forum, Abdullah called for democratic reform, yet added that “for reform to succeed, it must emerge from within our societies and not through external influence.”
While Abdullah’s task is great, the price of stagnation, repression, and violence is greater and demands a continuation of Jordanian initiative and knowledge.
Caught between Iraq and a hard place BY SIMON TISDALL - THE GUARDIAN
Caught between Iraq and a hard place
Simon Tisdall
Tuesday November 29, 2005
THE GUARDIAN
Jordan's 9/11 - the al-Qaida suicide bomb attacks on three Amman hotels on November 9 that killed 63 people - is still sending shockwaves across the kingdom. A new cabinet charged with waging "all-out war" against terrorism was appointed at the weekend. But Jordan's pro-western King Abdullah also insisted that his controversial reform programme, known as the "national agenda", must go forward.
This is a tall order for a country struggling to keep its head above water in a sea of instability. Jordan is caught between Iraq and a hard place - Israel-Palestine. Autocratic neighbours Syria and Saudi Arabia are poor paradigms for democratic change. In addition to its large population of Palestinian origin, up to 400,000 Iraqis have flooded in since 2003. And its close alliance with the US is domestically divisive.
The new prime minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, a former military intelligence chief, said reform and stability were compatible. "My government will maintain the balance between freedom and security," he promised. But
Mr Bakhit appeared cautious about the national agenda. "We will assess it ... and translate feasible recommendations into draft laws that in turn will go through the proper constitutional channels," he told Jordanian television.
Jordan's moderate Islamists, who want electoral reform and greater political freedoms, suggest a proposed anti-terror law could play into the militants' hands. "There is a need for vigilance but not for a tougher security grip that will only fuel extremism," the Islamic Action party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, said last week.
Despite revulsion at the Amman attacks and condemnation of their author, the Jordanian-born Iraqi insurgency leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there are fears that home-grown militancy apeing al-Qaida could grow without effective action to tackle poverty, unemployment and exclusion.The Muslim Brotherhood presented its own "comprehensive national reform" plan last month, calling for increased political pluralism and enhanced powers for parliament. But Bedouin conservatives, a key royal constituency, are wary of the democratic liberalisation that the US wants for Jordan and other Arab states. Jordan's pro-western establishment and business elites favour IMF-guided market reforms. But they too fear the rising power of non-violent, politicised Islam.
The king's efforts were in trouble long before November 9, said Professor Marc Lynch in the Carnegie Arab Reform Bulletin. "
After six years in power, King Abdullah had little to show for his frequent speeches about reform. His tenure had been characterised by a steady decline in freedoms ... Opinion polls reveal widespread alienation, with 80% in one survey [saying] they did not feel safe criticising the government in public," he said.
That made action on the national agenda even more important now, said the independent International Crisis Group last week. "To minimise the risk of future terror attacks that feed on simmering public dissatisfaction, Jordan should implement long-promised political reforms ... The regime should drive a wedge between jihadi and non-jihadi Islamists by promoting a tolerant vision of Islam," it said.
"
The public's lack of representation and shortage of economic opportunities has fed a romanticised notion of jihad," said the ICG's Robert Malley. "
The November attacks are a preview of what's to come unless the government gets serious about reform."
While King Abdullah appears to understand all this, internal resistance remains formidable, and may have stiffened since the bombings. And the potential of supra-national threats to discourage real change was dramatically illustrated during a weekend trial of al-Qaida suspects in Amman.
"Terrorism is a badge of honour on our chests until Judgment Day," one of the defendants shouted. "
We're pursuing jihad until we uproot you, exterminate your state, until the rule of the king vanishes ... Allah is our Lord. You have none. America is your God."
A very good and timely piece by Rami Khoury - I couldn't have agreed more
Can Jordan fight terror, democratically?By Rami G. Khouri
Wednesday, November 23, 2005
The lingering fallout from the November 9 terror attack against three hotels in Amman continues to be characterized by a peculiarly Jordanian combination of determination and indecision. The bold and courageous willingness by King Abdullah II and his state security capabilities to confront the criminals who kill civilians throughout the region and the world is somewhat countered by
a corresponding meekness in promoting the kind of domestic political reforms that would pull the rug out from under the terrorists, both in Jordan and regionally.
Amman is swirling with political emotions, expectations and rumors, as the results of the attacks remain unclear to most people.
There is also a widespread sense that things cannot stay the same - This has been on the surface for quite sometime now (AZ). Fighting terrorism with the same old methods will
work to a large extent, but will not prevent determined criminals from doing their evil deeds.
A qualitatively different kind of anti-terror policy is needed, and Jordan is one of the few places in the Arab world that could envisage moving down that path.I mentioned last week that
Jordan, unlike most other Arab states, has a special opportunity to make the sorts of historic, substantive changes in its society that could provide the first successful Arab example of a country that fights terror not only by military, security and intelligence means, but also by mobilizing Jordanians to forge a political culture based on inclusion and accountability that gives the terrorists and extremists no fertile ground in which to operate - This is one opportunity the leadership in Jordan can not miss (AZ). The general threat throughout the Middle East, and increasingly globally, is the spread of an extremist political ideology that also uses violence against its own societies as well as against foreign targets. Terror by Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
are symptoms of a deeper malaise, and older distortions and tensions in Arab society. These are fundamentally political in nature, along with economic and social aspects that cannot be ignored. The core pan-Arab problem that has allowed fundamentalist religious extremism to flourish and terror groups to emerge is the problem of abuse of political authority and economic resources in societies where average citizens feel increasingly alienated and powerless - Rami si so right in his analysis, terrorism directed at muslisms and non-muslims, arabs and non-arabs is the major symptom of a Sickness that has been plaguing the Arab society for years (AZ) . Blowing up hotels and embassies gives humiliated and marginalized Arabs a sense of empowerment, resistance and self-assertion, in ways not available to them through existing political systems. This happens, and expands, primarily because of
domestic indignities within Arab society, and these in turn are aggravated by the policies of Israel, the United States and other foreign powers whose troops routinely enter or sometimes occupy Arab lands for years at a time.
Defeating terror requires eliminating the underlying political environment allowing it to breed.
The antidote to terror is not only security measures managed by
police and intelligence agencies, or tougher new laws enforced by interior ministries.
The antidote is a political and economic culture in which a majority of ordinary citizens feel empowered, represented and respected as citizens with equal rights. This kind of citizenry,
working closely with its security agencies, can then provide political legitimacy and police efficiency that defeats existing terror groups and prevent new ones from springing up.
Jordan has the chance to pioneer this concept, if it can muster the courage and boldness on the political front that Abdullah has already shown on the security front, and in his assertions of the moderation of Islam represented by his own Hashemite family - I honestly doubt that the leadership has what it takes, courage, boldness, forsight and wisedomm, to grab this chance as shown by the lack of commitment and progress in the last three years in the reform track (AZ). Since November 9, we have witnessed political solidarity and moral indignation in Jordan - but these alone are not effective long-term tools in the battle against extremism and terror.
Practical political transformations are now needed to transform popular indignation and the leadership's moral boldness into a new phenomenon: Arab democracy, in which security agencies connect with and are empowered by their own citizenry, but also are held accountable to it.
Here are some ideas for procedures that could be instituted in Jordan to forge a closer, healthier relationship among the security services, the political institutions and the citizenry as a whole.
Jordan is uniquely placed today to do this because of the rare combination of assets and conditions defining it. The country enjoys strong public support for the king and leadership. The political elite has spoken often and impressively about setting an example of democratic transition and political reforms for the Arab world - but to date without its deeds matching its words - So right. We have become frustrated with plan after plan, with cabinet reshuffle after cabinet reshuffle,... till we became a nation of ministers, none of which has an accomplishment to be proud of and even those who want to affect change aren't given the opportunity as our cabinets are changed at least once every three months (AZ). The security apparatus is efficient and respected. It is time to bring these three forces together into a more profound political culture.
Four specific areas of innovation can be explored, benefiting the security agencies and the public at large.
The first is to forge a more formal, institutional link between the security system and the public through a civilian oversight body that meets regularly with the security leadership to evaluate policies and strategies, discuss complaints, evaluate budgets, make suggestions, and, most importantly, generate a sense of accountability and solidarity that is not always there now. A small group of distinguished persons could be appointed by the king as a security-sector advisory and oversight council, a modest first step toward a more institutionalized accountability mechanism that could be developed later. An even more limited trial could be done by appointing a civilian oversight committee to review the work of the anti-corruption department within the intelligence department.
A second step would be to open
the security sector to greater cooperation with the media, starting with regular interviews and press briefings, including background and off-the-record briefings.
If citizens knew more about the work, methods, needs and aims of the security agencies, this would have two powerful impacts: it would take away much of the sense of marginalization and powerlessness that many citizens feel in the face of their state security systems, which, they assume, can act with impunity; and it would, conversely, prompt many citizens to cooperate legitimately with the police and security sectors. More mutual trust between citizen and security agencies would benefit both.
A third possible move would be
to forge a more structured relationship of mutual accountability between the security agencies and both the elected lower house of Parliament and the appointed Upper House. This sort of give-and-take could happen in public at one level - the televised discussion of the security-sector budget, for example - while other issues would need to be discussed in closed committees.
The fourth suggestion relates to the police force, which is the security agency that is in the most direct, daily contact with the public at the local neighborhood level. It is vital that
police-community relations be improved and injected with a mechanism for two-way communication, feedback, complaints and problem-solving initiatives. It would be relevant now to establish some local police-community relations councils that include not just the traditional sheikhs and tribal and business leaders, but also young people, including women, who have their own security issues to raise. The police cannot ensure security alone; they can only do so with the active participation of communities.
These are four simple ideas that could be explored, among many others. Perhaps Jordanian citizens could be asked to send suggestions to the king and the government on how to forge a stronger relationship of accountability and communication between citizens and the security system.
This is absolutely crucial to the three goals that Jordan seeks to achieve and that confront all Arab states: fighting terrorism; promoting a stable society that does not give rise to extremist movements; and achieving a dignified, prosperous life for all citizens through political, economic, social and educational reforms. At some point, some Arab government will have to stop talking about these goals and start taking practical measures to achieve them.
Jordan has the best opportunity to do that, given its unique set of circumstances today. I hope it does so, and creates that one example of a democratic, inclusive, accountable Arab political culture in which stability emanates from the dignity and self-confidence of a satisfied citizenry, rather than from open-ended security laws and often unaccountable security agencies.
FOR GOD'S SAKE, NOT ANOTHER CABINET RESHUFFLE.... Jordan's government quits, monarch appoints new PM
Jordan's government quits, monarch appoints new PM
Thu Nov 24, 2005 9:51 AM ET
By Suleiman al-Khalidi
AMMAN (Reuters) - Jordan's King Abdullah appointed national security chief as prime minister on Thursday, two weeks after triple suicide bombings killed 60 people, a senior official said.
The official said the monarch asked acting national security head, Marouf Bakheet, who had also been serving as the king's office chief of staff, to form a new government following the resignation of Adnan Badran, 69, a U.S.-educated academic appointed last April, and his government. The choice of Bakheet, 58, a former ambassador to Israel with a long career in military intelligence, underscores the king's desire to give security forces a bigger role in decision making, a senior official told Reuters.
Although the changes had long been expected, security concerns have become a priority after the November 9 bombings at three luxury hotels, claimed by Al Qaeda wing in Iraq, headed by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Bakheet's appointment also signals the monarch wants to give more influence to old-guard military figures with a reputation for integrity and untainted by corruption, senior officials say.
Officials say the monarch will count on Bakheet to win support for his much touted economic and political reforms among the powerful conservative establishment -- the backbone of the monarch's power base -- which fears accelerated reforms could lead to an erosion of its grip on power."He (Bakheet) will balance security concerns with the need to push forward His Majesty's reform agenda to move the country toward greater political liberties," said one senior official. Bakheet is expected to form his government in the next few days.
WIDER CHANGES
The government change was part of a wider reshuffle that had been planned for months, including a shakeup of the royal court to bring in new advisors and the appointment of a new upper house with seasoned politicians to redress an imbalance against tribal politicians.King Abdullah surprised many when he appointed Badran to succeed Faisal al-Fayez, blamed by politicians for several policy blunders, including mismanagement of government finances.Tough parliamentary criticism of Badran's performance has been viewed as the most direct challenge to Abdullah since he assumed the throne in 1999.In the summer, Badran had to succumb to tribal pressure and accept the resignation of Bassem Awadallah, the king's favorite moderniser, and the driving force behind accelerated reforms.
Conservative deputies accused Badran of promoting a pro-Western reform agenda and ignoring tribal sensitivities. Political insiders say the king had been very frustrated with conservative politicians wielding extensive powers, who had tried to put the brakes on democratic reforms fearing they may dilute the influence of their Bedouin power base. They fear the king would promote changes in the electoral law which reformers say could give Palestinians bigger representation in parliament, now dominated by tribal politicians long seen as the backbone of the king's support. Most powers rest with the king, who appoints governments, approves legislation and can dissolve parliament.
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, against three hotels in the Jordanian's capital Amman on Wednesday evening, November 9th, 2005
. Firstly, the group has its own agenda and not necessary that of the main group led by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahri; secondly, it lacks clear strategic vision of its objectives and plans; and thirdly it has a "surplus of force" in terms of men, equipment and logistical capability.
In addition to what has been said regarding "power struggle" within Al-Qaeda and the reported message sent by Al-Zawahri to Al-Zarqawi, which reveals a conflict in their points of view; it is clear that Al-Zarqawi's attacks, especially in his main battlefield (Iraq), are carried out without any coordination or agreement with "Al-Qaeda of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahri".
Despite the historical "status" of Bin Laden as the world's most wanted after 9/11 attacks, nobody denies that Al-Zarqawi gained a higher status among those who are called "princes of terrorism " due to the semi daily mass killing attacks against Iraqi civilians, policemen, and army men, especially the Shiites, in addition to the continuous kidnapping and killing operations against civilians and diplomats in Iraq.
In this context, the actual status of Al-Zarqawi and his group have been elevated to the extent that one can't categorize them as a mere branch of a larger group. There is no doubt that the state of Al-Qaeda's fragmentation is due to the severe and relentless blows it has suffered and the tight siege on its prominent leaders. This situation gave rise to Zarqawi's leadership and his agenda, which differs from that of bin Laden's.
While the main group of Al-Qaeda tries to launch attacks against Western targets, especially in the Western capitals and cities and accelerate a shameful American withdrawal from Iraq, most of Al-Zarqawi's efforts are directed towards the Shiites and civilians in Iraq, and the guests of hotels and wedding celebrations in Amman.
Currently, Bin Laden seeks to carry out attacks against Anglo-Saxon targets or against countries participating in what he calls "the crusaders' campaign against Islam." This is clear in the operations launched against the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, aimed at embarrassing the Western governments and influencing their peoples and media to force changes in their governments' policies towards the region and speed up the dismantling of the Western coalition on "war on terrorism." But it seems the abovementioned motives are not priorities on Al-Zarqawi's agenda.
We cannot endorse any assessment that lessens the impact of the atrocities committed by Al-Qaida against Islam and Muslims in particular and humanity in general, but
comparing what is done by this group, founded in the late 1980s, with what is apparent from Al-Zarqawi's agenda after Iraq's occupation shows how these terrorist groups have evolved in their savage and appalling acts.An essential question arises about the objectives of the planners of the Amman attacks that killed 57 and injured around 100 persons. Despite the dozens of articles and analyses that filled the media about these attacks, many people have not figured out yet the precise objectives of Al-Zarqawi group. There doesn't seem to be a lack of analyses; instead, it is clear that the officials' assessments and monitors' analyses failed to identify logical pretexts for the crime due to the absence of such pretexts in the first place.
The immediate results of the attacks have been clear on the Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and international levels, which widely rejected and condemned the attacks. It seems that these attacks increased the solidarity of the Jordanian society and enhanced the ties between the Jordanian leadership and its people. Thus, Al-Qaeda group (in Iraq) lost a lot of the sympathy that was gaining from the Jordanian street, which considered the group's activities in Iraq as fighting the occupation.
On the other hand, the Jordanian security services have become more vigilant and more prepared to face future operations and to control the Iraqi borders. King Abdullah declared that he is fully and relentlessly determined to combat terrorism. He added also that his country "will no longer tolerate those adopting deviating thoughts of Takfeer (charging others of being infidels)." Jordan now is receiving offers of help for coordination and security from many countries and great powers in the region and international community.
In a simple review, it is clear that until now these attacks didn't yield their perpetrators any fruits. And the statement that Al-Zarqawi group was forced to issue after declaring its responsibility of the attacks, which seems to justify the attacks rather than to explain them, may support this suggestion. The statement, which came after huge protests arranged by Jordanians against terrorism, stated that the attacks "targeted anti Islamic centers and favorite sites for the USA and Israeli intelligence members." Undoubtedly, this statement cannot improve the image of the group in view of its huge blunder and lack of logic.Referring back to the third conclusion of the Amman attacks regarding the "Al-Zarqawi group's surplus of power," it is definitely not a positive one since that power can be used to harm soft civilian targets in many countries. And "surplus of power" here means what the group has in terms of suicide persons, arms, and logistical capability as embodied in training, transportation, accommodation, preparations, coordination, and communications. All these were available outside the Iraqi borders (the main battlefield that needs all the available abilities) and were used in attacks that one cannot imagine having rational objectives behind them, even from the view of Al-Zarqawi's greatest sympathizers or the extreme opponents of the Jordanian policies.
In fact, the November attacks in Amman represent, in many ways, a point of departure. The attacks are the severest that have hit the Jordanian capital in history, and they will surely be highly effective in rallying the public and governmental efforts against terrorism in Jordan. These attacks will certainly enhance the international and regional coordination efforts against terrorism and reduce the emphasis on the international and regional factors that feed that sympathy, especially those related to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the Israeli practices against the Palestinians.Whether the Amman blasts came as a result of "surplus of power" in Al-Zarqawi's group, or to achieve certain goals inside Jordan, or due to strategic mistake, or tactical error, it is clear that recruiting Iraqi suicide attackers, directing them to carry out operations in a capital known for its high security measures, and launching attacks leading to many victims, are factors that should increase caution and hasten the efforts to develop regional and international strategies and mechanisms to combat the terrorist attacks in their different phases.
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
Al- Qaeda Strikes Jordan: Dimensions and Repercussions
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, against three hotels in the Jordanian's capital Amman on Wednesday evening, November 9th, 2005
. Firstly, the group has its own agenda and not necessary that of the main group led by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahri; secondly, it lacks clear strategic vision of its objectives and plans; and thirdly it has a "surplus of force" in terms of men, equipment and logistical capability.
In addition to what has been said regarding "power struggle" within Al-Qaeda and the reported message sent by Al-Zawahri to Al-Zarqawi, which reveals a conflict in their points of view; it is clear that Al-Zarqawi's attacks, especially in his main battlefield (Iraq), are carried out without any coordination or agreement with "Al-Qaeda of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahri".
Despite the historical "status" of Bin Laden as the world's most wanted after 9/11 attacks, nobody denies that Al-Zarqawi gained a higher status among those who are called "princes of terrorism " due to the semi daily mass killing attacks against Iraqi civilians, policemen, and army men, especially the Shiites, in addition to the continuous kidnapping and killing operations against civilians and diplomats in Iraq.
In this context, the actual status of Al-Zarqawi and his group have been elevated to the extent that one can't categorize them as a mere branch of a larger group. There is no doubt that the state of Al-Qaeda's fragmentation is due to the severe and relentless blows it has suffered and the tight siege on its prominent leaders. This situation gave rise to Zarqawi's leadership and his agenda, which differs from that of bin Laden's.
While the main group of Al-Qaeda tries to launch attacks against Western targets, especially in the Western capitals and cities and accelerate a shameful American withdrawal from Iraq, most of Al-Zarqawi's efforts are directed towards the Shiites and civilians in Iraq, and the guests of hotels and wedding celebrations in Amman.
Currently, Bin Laden seeks to carry out attacks against Anglo-Saxon targets or against countries participating in what he calls "the crusaders' campaign against Islam." This is clear in the operations launched against the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, aimed at embarrassing the Western governments and influencing their peoples and media to force changes in their governments' policies towards the region and speed up the dismantling of the Western coalition on "war on terrorism." But it seems the abovementioned motives are not priorities on Al-Zarqawi's agenda.
We cannot endorse any assessment that lessens the impact of the atrocities committed by Al-Qaida against Islam and Muslims in particular and humanity in general, but
comparing what is done by this group, founded in the late 1980s, with what is apparent from Al-Zarqawi's agenda after Iraq's occupation shows how these terrorist groups have evolved in their savage and appalling acts.An essential question arises about the objectives of the planners of the Amman attacks that killed 57 and injured around 100 persons. Despite the dozens of articles and analyses that filled the media about these attacks, many people have not figured out yet the precise objectives of Al-Zarqawi group. There doesn't seem to be a lack of analyses; instead, it is clear that the officials' assessments and monitors' analyses failed to identify logical pretexts for the crime due to the absence of such pretexts in the first place.
The immediate results of the attacks have been clear on the Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and international levels, which widely rejected and condemned the attacks. It seems that these attacks increased the solidarity of the Jordanian society and enhanced the ties between the Jordanian leadership and its people. Thus, Al-Qaeda group (in Iraq) lost a lot of the sympathy that was gaining from the Jordanian street, which considered the group's activities in Iraq as fighting the occupation.
On the other hand, the Jordanian security services have become more vigilant and more prepared to face future operations and to control the Iraqi borders. King Abdullah declared that he is fully and relentlessly determined to combat terrorism. He added also that his country "will no longer tolerate those adopting deviating thoughts of Takfeer (charging others of being infidels)." Jordan now is receiving offers of help for coordination and security from many countries and great powers in the region and international community.
In a simple review, it is clear that until now these attacks didn't yield their perpetrators any fruits. And the statement that Al-Zarqawi group was forced to issue after declaring its responsibility of the attacks, which seems to justify the attacks rather than to explain them, may support this suggestion. The statement, which came after huge protests arranged by Jordanians against terrorism, stated that the attacks "targeted anti Islamic centers and favorite sites for the USA and Israeli intelligence members." Undoubtedly, this statement cannot improve the image of the group in view of its huge blunder and lack of logic.Referring back to the third conclusion of the Amman attacks regarding the "Al-Zarqawi group's surplus of power," it is definitely not a positive one since that power can be used to harm soft civilian targets in many countries. And "surplus of power" here means what the group has in terms of suicide persons, arms, and logistical capability as embodied in training, transportation, accommodation, preparations, coordination, and communications. All these were available outside the Iraqi borders (the main battlefield that needs all the available abilities) and were used in attacks that one cannot imagine having rational objectives behind them, even from the view of Al-Zarqawi's greatest sympathizers or the extreme opponents of the Jordanian policies.
In fact, the November attacks in Amman represent, in many ways, a point of departure. The attacks are the severest that have hit the Jordanian capital in history, and they will surely be highly effective in rallying the public and governmental efforts against terrorism in Jordan. These attacks will certainly enhance the international and regional coordination efforts against terrorism and reduce the emphasis on the international and regional factors that feed that sympathy, especially those related to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the Israeli practices against the Palestinians.Whether the Amman blasts came as a result of "surplus of power" in Al-Zarqawi's group, or to achieve certain goals inside Jordan, or due to strategic mistake, or tactical error, it is clear that recruiting Iraqi suicide attackers, directing them to carry out operations in a capital known for its high security measures, and launching attacks leading to many victims, are factors that should increase caution and hasten the efforts to develop regional and international strategies and mechanisms to combat the terrorist attacks in their different phases.
Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism - A New report by The International Crisis Group...
A good reading for the weekend...Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi IslamismMiddle East Report N°47 23
November 2005
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
For access to the full report (23 PAGES)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3801EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The horrifying 9 November 2005 suicide attacks against three hotels in Amman -- with a toll of 60 dead and over 100 wounded -- drove home two important messages. No security apparatus, however efficient, can prevent each and every attack by a person prepared to die as they kill others. And any security response must be complemented by a genuine opening of the political system and more equally shared economic opportunity if Jordan is to minimise the risk of further attacks and instability. In the identity of their perpetrators and the background of their apparent mastermind, the attacks spoke volumes about Jordan's predicament. They were carried out by Iraqis, who were angered by events in their country, had arrived in the Kingdom only days earlier and chose America's close ally in the region as the target for their revenge. And they reportedly were masterminded by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadi commander fighting in Iraq who elicits a measure of domestic sympathy insofar as he gives voice to popular hostility toward U.S. policy and alienation toward the country's Westernised elite.
Feeding on disaffection with a government that has failed to address basic needs and maintains an unpopular alliance with the U.S., violent Islamist militants have flourished of late. As in most other Middle East and North African countries, the victorious return of those who fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan led to the creation of a domestic jihadi Salafi movement in the early 1990s.
Having encouraged the spread of traditional, peaceful Salafism to balance an increasingly Palestine-oriented Muslim Brotherhood, the regime was ill-prepared to deal with the arrival of these radicalised young men who turned Salafism on its head by giving it a violent bent.The security services at first kept jihadis in check. But over time, their elastic reach and
the introduction of more repressive laws generated new frustrations and renewed interest in radical agendas. The last few years in particular have seen
growing public criticism of a leadership that allied itself with the West at a time of intense anti-Americanism and failed both to deliver anticipated economic dividends to anyone but the elites and to implement promised political reforms. Lack of representation and participation, combined with a shortage of economic opportunities, fed into a romanticised notion of jihad that has sent a steady trickle of young men across the border to join the fight against the U.S. and its perceived proxies in Iraq. Others, it appears from recent events, remain in Jordan, where they can lay the groundwork for suicide attacks carried out by non-Jordanians who slip across the border and reach their targets before the security services get wind of them.
The hotel attacks produced strong but likely temporary revulsion against jihadi terrorism, and the regime has understandably reacted by announcing tougher security measures, but these cannot suffice and, without other, more proactive steps, may well backfire. Besides anger at U.S. regional policies and the monarchy's acquiescence in them,
sympathy for the jihadis has its roots in an overly constricted political system, growing economic inequality, shrinking opportunities and anger at widespread corruption. For years, the regime has promised an ambitious reform program. The time has come for it to implement this at home with the same ardour with which it advertises it abroad. A three-pronged strategy is needed, addressing political, economic and cultural challenges. RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
Political measures. The regime should take advantage of its current popular support resulting from outrage at the bombings to:
(a)
review laws and decisions that curtail political freedoms and, where necessary amend or -- as in the specific case of the draft professional associations law -- abandon them;(b)
draft a new electoral law providing a more accurate popular representation; and
(c)
form a broader, more inclusive government coalition incorporating opposition tendencies in order to carry out these political reforms and implement the proposed National Agenda, including the long-awaited new electoral law.2.
Economic measures. The regime should expand opportunities for the poor and unemployed to share more fairly and fully in Jordan's real growth by taking urgent steps to:
(a)
remove obstacles to job creation and provide job training and skill building programs;
(b)
cushion hardships for the least fortunate;(c)
provide start-up financing and low-cost administrative support for small entrepreneurial efforts; and(d)
attack corruption more strongly.3.
Cultural measures. The regime should seek to drive a wedge between jihadi and non-jihadi Islamists, by acting to:
(a)
promote a tolerant version of Islam in all educational institutions;
(b)
launch an ideological campaign against fitna (discord) among Muslims; and
(c)
provide genuine space for credible, competent, independent preachers and religious teachers who denounce violence -- including those who are critical of government policy -- to debate Salafi ideologues.
Very depressing news... Extremists 'hijack Islam's image'
For more information, you can check their website athttp://www.islamperceptions.org/Extremists 'hijack Islam's image'By Peter Feuilherade BBC Monitoring, in Amsterdam
The West's image of Islam has been hijacked by extremists, delegates at the recent News Xchange broadcasting conference in Amsterdam heard.
Debate was prompted by
the results of a Kuwaiti government survey that found the depiction of Muslims in the US and European media was "typically stereotypical and negative".
Several speakers concluded that the role of the media should be to understand and illustrate the complexity of the Islamic world, rather than dealing in such generalisations.
'Widespread ignorance' The session began with Chris Yalonis of Communique Partners presenting the findings of a new international survey, "Western perceptions about Islam and Muslims", which he carried out on behalf of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments) and Islamic Affairs.
Things are being done in the name of religion, but it's not good enough for the media to describe them simply as Islamic Phil Harding, BBC World Service
He said there was a paradox between the perception by many Europeans of their Muslim neighbours and colleagues as "good people", while Muslims they see on television are often depicted as "terrorists".
Between March and August 2005 the survey team carried out more than 2,400 online interviews in Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. Their findings included:
- Muslims rated lowest in overall favourability among various religious groups.
- Ignorance of and lack of empathy with Islam is widespread.
- The portrayal of Arabs and Muslims varies according to the type of media, "but it is typically stereotypical and negative, although improving especially in certain prestigious news organisations".
- TV documentaries and news are the most influential media in influencing feelings about Arab Muslims, followed by newspapers.
- Nearly three-quarters of respondents believe that the media depicts Arab Muslims and Islam accurately only half the time, not often or never.
Trevor Mostyn, an analyst of European media interviewed by the survey team, said:
"
Television loves the image of the ugly, ferocious blood-curdling Muslims." Articulate, "mainstream" Muslims are rarely seen on TV in Britain, Mostyn asserted.
Heated debateThe News Xchange session on "Reporting Islam" saw a passionate debate during which some Arab journalists complained that Muslims were frequently demonised in the Western media, while many European broadcasters stressed the need to avoid using inflammatory terms and to give airtime to moderate voices as well as extremists.
Abdul Bari Atwan, editor of the London-based paper al-Quds al-Arabi, complained of the West's coverage of the Muslim world, saying that when radical groups "hijacked" Islam, Western media simplistically depicted this as "Muslim terrorism".
He added: "
Whatever we do, we are still rejected by the West... As a Muslim in Europe, which is supposed to be the continent of human rights, I am really frightened."
Wadah Khanfar, managing director of al-Jazeera, said many media and correspondents failed to differentiate between the Muslim religion and cultural tradition. He too agreed: "We should abandon simplistic coverage."
Feelings ran high when Ayan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born Dutch MP whose criticism of Islam sent her into hiding after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, spoke. She accused Arab journalists of seeing all problems as caused by some outside force, and said they should engage in more self-reflection.
Her remarks that "
there is a total lack of freedom in the Arab and Islamic world", as well as "a lack of equality for and a culture of violence towards women", provoked angry denials and denunciations from many Arab and other journalists in the hall.
"Things are being done in the name of religion, but it's not good enough for the media to describe them simply as Islamic," concluded Phil Harding of BBC World Service, summing up what emerged as the majority consensus after a very heated discussion.
Index ranks Middle East freedom... We still score low and we are behind Palestine and Iraq - Two states under occupation... WALLA HARAM
Index ranks Middle East freedomBBC ONLINE
There is a wide range of democratisation across the Middle East, a survey by a leading research and advisory firm has found.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked 20 countries on 15 indicators of political and civil liberty. The Index of Political Freedom lists Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories as the most democratic parts of the region.
Libya received the lowest rating, below Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Reform resisted
The EIU scored each country on a 10-point scale, awarding one point for the least political freedom and 10 for the most.
INDEX OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
Israel: 8.20
Lebanon: 6.55
Morocco: 5.20
Iraq: 5.05
Palestine: 5.05
Kuwait: 4.90
Tunisia: 4.60
Jordan: 4.45 (We can say that we are in the same league with Egypt, Sudan & Yemen)
Qatar: 4.45
Egypt: 4.30
Sudan: 4.30
Yemen: 4.30
Algeria: 4.15
Oman: 4.00
Bahrain: 3.85
Iran: 3.85
UAE: 3.70
Saudi Arabia: 2.80
Syria: 2.80
Libya: 2.05
Source: EIU
The analysts found little evidence of democratisation in some countries. Sitting at the bottom of the table, Libya has long had a reputation as one of the world's worst violators of human rights.
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's government has also long restricted freedom of expression and independent political activity.
Saudi Arabia held its first ever exercise in democracy in February 2005 when it held municipal elections, but remains an absolute monarchy that has resisted pressure for reform.
Syria, meanwhile, is renowned for its authoritarian rule even though there has been a degree of liberalisation under President Bashar al-Assad.
Progress
Though there are few surprises at the bottom of the table, the top five may raise eyebrows.
It contains three of the most volatile parts of the region: Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq.
FREEDOM INDICATORS
Election of head of government
Election of parliament
Fairness of electoral laws
Right to organise political parties
Power of elected representatives
Presence of an opposition
Transparency
Minority participation
Level of corruption
Freedom of assembly
Independence of the judiciary
Press freedom
Religious freedom
Rule of law
Property rights
Source: EIU
BBC Middle East analyst Roger Hardy says there is unquestionably a new mood in the region, but progress has been uneven.
Lebanon is free in a very particular sense: it is no longer under military occupation. Most Palestinians do not enjoy that freedom, and yet they have just had local elections and are preparing for parliamentary ones in January, our correspondent says.
As for Iraq, its high score is a bit surprising, given the level of violence there, our correspondent says.
Iraqis no long live under a dictatorship and now have plenty of publications and political parties to choose from. But their freedom of movement is constrained by the bombings and kidnappings, and that is a big limitation.
